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ABSTRACT

Anti-Castro activists began organizing guerrilla groups in the early 1960's
to oppose the revolutionary government of Cuba. The perception that the
new regime posed a threat to religion and pre-existing cultural values were
among the motives for this activity. This thesis presents three case studies of
individuals who due to their beliefs, became guerrillas, were imprisoned for
that activity, and who subsequently refused to participate in the prison
reeducation program. The findings of this study indicate that ideology and
beliefs function to provide meaningful explanations to social life, and are not
necessarily thin veils for self interest masquerading as principle. Rather,
im portant religious and cultural beliefs take on a life of their own
independent of material self interest; this allows for individuals to commit to
causes where there are powerful incentives to renounce one's beliefs.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
This thesis presents the stories of three veterans of Cuban political
prisons as case studies in the persistence of belief in the face of coercive
environments. These men were interviewed in Las Vegas, four to fifteen
years after their release, but their recollections remain vivid. All of these men
were "plantados". those who refused reeducation by the Castro regime. The
thesis approaches their story from a cultural and symbolic perspective in
which the understanding of the meanings which individuals place on events
in their lives and the choices that they must make are the primary focus of
interest. By studying their life stories from the perspective of the actors, the
thesis contributes to our understanding both of the process of the formation
of belief, and of the dynamics of systems of incarceration which are
commonly a feature of authoritarian regimes in both the developed and
undeveloped worlds.
I chose to employ case studies for both theoretical and methodological
reasons. The men who shared their stories with me came from all races and
classes of Cuban society before the revolution, and apart from the system they
confronted, their lives offered few superficial similarities. By using case
studies, the formation of belief in each separate instance could be examined
without generalizing and obliterating important aspects of the process. The
data in this study supported those theoretical points of view which stress the
1
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importance of primary group interaction in the formation and maintenance
of closely held beliefs. A case study approach enabled me to examine the
underlying processes of enculturation which produced the ability of these
men to withstand severe deprivation and stress when confronting one of the
most powerful and long lasting regimes in the Americas.
The three men whose stories are the focus of the thesis were selected
from interviews with nearly a dozen former prisoners who have emigrated
to Las Vegas. The people featured in this paper have been verified to me as
actual plantados by Vivian Martinez, formerly of Catholic Relief Services,
who was involved in the process of administering their arrival from Cuba to
Las Vegas. All were able to produce identification cards which listed them as
members of the Association of Historic Cuban Political Prisoners, and two of
them are listed in the appendix of the book Twenty Years and Forty Days: Life
in A Cuban Prison by Jorge Vails (1986). A photograph of one of my
informants appears in an edition of Bovardo (newsletter of the former
prisoners association) and the signature of another appears on a prison
petition reproduced in the book Cuba: Memorias de un Presienero Politico
(Pardo, 1992). Approval for this work was obtained from the UNLV Office of
Research Administration on June 4, 1993, prior to any formal interviewing.
Because each story is unique, the cases are not presented as typical of all
political prisoners. However, many of the elements in their stories can be
found in the interviews I conducted with other former prisoners in Las
Vegas. These common threads allow the anthropologist to examine the
cultural processes which produce dedication to ideals and willingness to
endure extreme hardship in service to a political ideology.

3

The conception of ideology as a clash of interests masquerading as a clash
of principles is a much discussed idea in 20th century intellectual thought.
The idea was anticipated by various theoreticians from Machiavelli to Marx,
and has been elaborated on by such contemporary anthropologists as Marvin
Harris (1979). Ideology is presented as a weapon, a mask that thinly veils
material self interest. One example in anthropology of this conception of
ideology as a rationalization for material relationships is Harris' argument
that Aztec cannibalism arose and persisted not due to religious beliefs, but as a
practical solution to a protein deficiency. The religious sanctioning of
cannibalism is presented as something of an afterthought, an ideological
garland of a cost-efficient material solution (Harris, 1979). In a wider sense,
this viewpoint of ideology as a cover for self interest has gained a strong
acceptance in the general public as well.
Clifford Geertz critiques interest theory's insights, arguing that it and
similar materialist explanations have often lapsed into viewing beliefs solely
as a form of narrow utilitarianism (1973:204). Too often, Geertz contends, the
other functions of ideology are overlooked. Geertz notes that ideology
provides a symbolic outlet for emotional disturbances generated by social
disequalibrium (ibid:204). Moreover, interest theory also has difficulty
explaining the persistence of belief in cases where there are powerful material
incentives to switch ideologies. Interest theory undervalues the extent to
which ideologies sustain individuals during times of strain, and provide
meaningful explanations to sociocultural phenomena. Geertz traces this line
of reasoning through Durkheim, Freud and Parsons.
Whatever else ideologies may be- projections of unacknowledged fears,
disguises for ulterior motives, phatic expressions of group solidarity- they are,
most distinctly, maps of problematic social reality and matrices for the
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creation of collective conscience... and it is in turn, the attempt of ideologies
to render otherwise incomprehensible social situations meaningful, to so
construe them as to make it possible to act purposefully within them, that
accounts both for the ideologies highly figurative nature and for the intensity
with which, once accepted, they are held.(Geertz, ibid:220).
This paper interprets the behavior, beliefs and experiences of a certain
group of people from this viewpoint of ideology as a struggle for meaning.
The plantados behavior in prison supports such an interpretation. Most had
been sentenced to 15-20 year prison terms and were living in harsh conditions
that included separation from family, inadequate medical attention and
subjugation to various forms of psychological and physical abuse, including
both beatings and bayonetings. If they would only accept the political
rehabilitation program, they would be allowed more humane treatment,
more frequent family visits, conjugal visits, an end to violent treatm ent from
the guards, better food and medicine, and finally, an earlier release from
prison. The plantados refused any and all compromise with the regime and
would not participate in the rehabilitation program. For this refusal, the
treatment meted out to them remained violent in nature and many were
injured or killed.
Interviews indicate that my informants refused rehabilitation due to
their adherence to beliefs that interest theorists would have labeled as masks.
My study indicates that beliefs which have been enculturated into individuals
at a young age take on a life of their own independent of material
circumstances. They provide a source of meaning in which individuals can
act purposefully and meaningfully, regardless of any perceived or latent self
interest. These peoples motives for resisting were not, by any reasonable
criteria I could come up with, based primarily on material incentives. Certain
occurrences during the war and subsequent imprisonment have led me to
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conclude that among the former prisoners that I have studied, personal
beliefs and cultural values were more important than any cost-benefit
analysis of their economic position when attempting to determine motives
for resistance. This does not imply that they never acted in their own self
interest or that they were not capable of calculating their options like anyone
else; rather, I argue that certain cultural values and beliefs - both religious and
political ideas - did at times act as exceptionally strong counterweights to
material self interest.
Belief Formation
Spiro's (1984) discussion of belief formation provides a persuasive
explaination of the power of these structures. According to Spiro, once a
cultural proposition is acquired as a personal belief by social actors, it becomes
a psychological event (a private and emotional element is added). The
process by which these cultural frames inform personal beliefs and how social
actions consequently construct social reality can be diagrammed as follows:
1. As a result of normal enculturation processes, social actors learn about
the propositions (cultural frames).
2. The actors come to understand their traditional meanings as displayed
in authoritative texts or by recognized experts.
3. The actors internalize the propositions and hold them to be true,
correct or right. It is then that they are acquired as personal beliefs. The
transformation of a cultural proposition into a culturally constructed belief
serves to structure their perceptual world and guide their actions.
4. At this level, culturally constituted beliefs serve not only to guide but
to instigate action - they process emotional, motivational and cognitive
salience. Hence, anti-communism now becomes more than just a cultural

proposition for the political prisoner; it is internalized as part of the
motivational forces and encourages him to action. Willing to act on his
beliefs, the prisoner is not afraid to die and is prepared to face decades of
imprisonment in order to stand up for his beliefs and values.
Spiro claims that the emotions and the self vary as a function of the
diversity in cultures. I would suggest, alternately, that the relationship
between the self and culture is better described not as dependent variable and
cause, but as mutually interactive. Humans constantly create and recreate
culture, interpret and reinterpret events, making the idea of a contradictory
and subjective social reality with contingent meaning a viable conception.
The relativistic implications of this imply that cultural frames are
susceptible of neither confirmation or disconfirmation (Spiro, 1984:336). This
is because, in Spiro's understanding of Shweder, they are (1) arbitrary, being
grounded in neither logic nor experience, and (2) being arbitrary, they are
neither rational nor irrational but non-rational. Hence, beliefs lie outside the
realm of the hard sciences, and the anthropologist must explicate the internal
rules of coherence native to them. Cultural frames construct, more than
reflect, social reality. In this sense, cultural frames are irreconcilable with one
another.
So far, all that we have basically said is that people internalize beliefs and
then act on them. What interests me is why we accept certain political beliefs
and reject others. Under what conditions are we likely to act with force to
further political goals? Under what conditions are recruitment into guerrilla
armies likely to occur? What or who, actually influences genuine political
development or conversion?
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From Belief To Action
Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, (1991) addresses the issues of recruitment
and mobilization in Latin American guerrilla groups. He has proposed a
model that is relevant in both explaining the plantados original involvement
with the clandestine opposition against Castro, and their subsequent behavior
in prison, including the refusal to participate in rehabilitation. WickhamCrowley first rejects the idea of "consciousness raising" as a model of
mobilization for being untenable in the light of the majority of data derived
from the study of insurgent groups. Consciousness raising as a process of
mobilization can be diagrammed in the following manner:
1 There exist higher and lower levels of consciousness.
2 Peasants (guajirosh and the urban poor who fought against the
revolution are ordinarily at a relatively low level of consciousness.
3 Peasants (or in the case of the political prisoners,
counterrevolutionaries) do not understand the reality of their own social
world. Corollary: The plantados are controlled by and have internalized the
ideology of the ruling class or dominant group, and hence are suffering from
"false consciousness" and cannot see where their true interests lie.
4 The world view internalized by the plantados inhibits their potential
for revolutionary thought. Corollary: Acquisition of a different world view
through consciousness raising will lead to radical acts).
5 The plantados can attain a higher level of consciousness only through
interaction with revolutionary intellectuals.
Wickham-Crowley takes a relativistic stance, any converts to the new
"consciousness" should not be regarded as holding an epistemologically
privileged position (ibid: 108).

I do not argue with the idea that we internalize the beliefs of our culture
and then act on them, rather I take exception to the context in which this
consciousness raising model conceives how certain ideas will be accepted and
others rejected. Political beliefs are most likely to be accepted by the individual
when the source of those beliefs stem from tight-knit, primary groups, that is,
from people who with the subject has intimate and strong positive emotional
bonds. To expect that people will accept ideologies derived from coercive
secondary groups ( aquantances, strangers, people who are not emotionally
close to the subject) which are already identified as the enemy in the
individual's current belief system, to convert to a group that has already
physically mistreated them, is unrealistic. Hence political rehabilitation is
unlikely to recruit many genuine converts, those who join are most likely to
be solely interested in reduced prison sentences and are ideologically dubious.
And when proselytizing in this manner among the "hard-core" politically
committed members of the guerrilla movement, the government can expect
little more than rejection and the continued, even deepening adherence to
previous political and religious beliefs.
Wickham-Crowley instead proposes his "attachment-network model of
mobilization." This model is consistent with my data and outline the
weaknesses of the consciousness raising model as an explanatory device. The
group dynamics inherent in the attachment-network model would be for my
informants, conducive for joining an insurgent group. The attachmentnetwork model would also imply likely failure for such programs as re
education and rehabilitation that were offered in prison. While many
prisoners undoubtedly participated in this program, it is highly unlikely that
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it is going to be anywhere near as effective at recruiting or creating genuine
converts as the attachment-network model.
I accept Wickham-Crowley’s proposition regarding recruitment and will
present it here:
Proposition: Guerrillas do not secure backing and recruits primarily
through unstructured attempts at "consciousness raising." If shifts in peoples
world views do take place-whether before or after recruitment into the
guerrilla army- such ideological conversions will tend to take place through
the operations of structured social networks, just as similar political and
religious conversions have done elsewhere (Wickham-Crowley, 1991:20).
This is in direct contrast to the "consciousness raising" model of political
proselytizing, which views ideologies as rational entities accepted or rejected
based on the relationship solely between the target group and the
proselytizing agent. It undervalues pre-existing social ties when determining
the likely chances of successful conversion.
The attachment network model of mobilization, which I view as
superior, runs like this:
1 Existence or formation of attachment network (In our case, kinship,
religious orientation and schooling, primary group bonding in the armed
forces).
2 Social pressures for ideological shifts toward network norm (gradual
internalization of values and beliefs that are congruent with powerful
primary group networks).
3 Ideological conversion, realignment (full identification with the
guerrillas)
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4 Successful recruitment, resource mobilization (active phase of guerrilla
war)
Wickham-Crowley further adds that this model rests on "a wealth of
sociological evidence that we form our political and religious beliefs in group
contexts, often primary-group ones." (ibid:21).
One organization that followed this model is the CIA itself. The
following quotation comes directly from one of their guerrilla recruitment
and training manuals.
Primary Groups and Secondary Groups. Another principle of sociology is
that we humans forge or change our opinions from two sources: primarily,
through our association with our family, comrades, or intimate friends; and
secondarily, through distant associations such as acquaintances in churches,
clubs or committees, labor unions or governmental organizations. The
Armed Propaganda team cadres should join the first groups in order to
persuade them to follow the policies of our movement, because it is from this
type of group that the opinions or changes of opinion come (Psychological
Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, 1983:26).
Moreover, it does not rely on the highly dubious assumptions that there
exist "true" and "false" or higher or lower states of consciousness, or on the
corollary assumption that people are too stupid to understand their own
situations (Wickham-Crowly, 1991:21).
This model would also help explain the ineffectiveness of the
governments various reeducation and rehabilitation programs offered to the
prisoners after incarceration. The prison reeducation programs can be viewed
as having relied on the extensive use of secondary groups (prison employees,
teachers, political cadre) employing a "consciousness raising" model of
political recruitment and conversion. The Cuban government was probably
aware of the importance that primary group attachments play in political
conversion, for they would have their "revolutionary instructors" of the
rehabilitation programs eat sleep and live with the trainees. None of the ex
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prisoners in the rehabilitation program who I interviewed ever looked at the
political cadre as part of the "in-group." They were still regarded as jailers.
The "rehabilitated" prisoners said that they participated only to get out of
prison faster, never became Marxists, and left for the United States at the first
opportunity. Those prisoners who rejected rehabilitation (delineating the "in
group" from the "out-group" very clearly) and became "plantados" (die-hards,
recalcitrants) to this day rely on one another as their primary support
network. Since most came to the US. and Las Vegas without any family or
money, the bonds that united them first in the guerrilla movement and then
in prison find formal expression in the Organization of Historical Political
Prisoners of Cuba. They joined the commandos through beliefs and networks
formed from primary groups, they rejected rehabilitation because it violated
their dearest beliefs and values (which were gradually formed from primary
groups). Genuine conversion to ideologies being proselytized by secondary
groups already identified as the enemy will rarely if ever occur.
Methods
I was first introduced to the former prisoners by a social worker who was
familiar with their stories. All interviews were conducted in Spanish, as the
informants did not understand or speak English. Most interviews were
conducted with the help of a fluent bilingual interpreter. Occasionally I
conducted interviews alone.
Most of my informants live in the area behind Vegas World known
informally as the Naked City. It is a poor section of town with high rates of
crime and gang violence. Most of my informants are employed in the casino
industry as dishwashers. Some have kinsmen here in Las Vegas, but none
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live with family members. The network of fellow former prisoners is the
crucial social structure in their lives.
The accounts of the former prisoners are history from the point of view
of the actors involved. The narratives are subjective documents. As such,
they are a rich mixture of memories from as long ago as 1959, and subsequent
experiences. Many elements are reformulations of earlier held beliefs. The
passage of years affects memory, and translating a foreign language
compounds the problem of interpretation.
A postmodernist perspective enables us to study such accounts without
being trapped by issues of accuracy or representativeness. The data in the body
of this work was informed by what Geertz (1983) defines as "experience-near"
and "experience-distant" concepts. Experience-near concepts are those in
which a subject, in our case an informant, might naturally use to define what
he or his associates see, feel or think, and which he would readily understand
when applied by others (ibid:53). An experience-distant concept is one which
specialists such as anthropologists use as definitions in order to advance
philosophical, practical or scientific concepts. Geertz (1983) cites "love" as an
experience-near concept and "object-cathexis" as an experience-distant one. In
my study, "Freedom Commando" would translate to experience-near and
terms such as "insurgent" and "revitalization" would be defined as
experience-distant. Unlike the distinction between etics or emics, the concepts
are not polar opposites, but vary by matter of degree (ibid:53).
This thesis does not describe events using solely one or the other of the
concepts. This is because neither concept is preferred over the other:
Confinement to experience-near concepts leaves an ethnographer awash
in immediacies, as well as entangled in vernacular. Confinement to
experience-distant ones leaves him stranded in abstractions and smothered in
jargon. The real question, and the one Malinowski raised...is what role the
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two sorts of concepts play in anthropological analysis. Or, more exactly, how,
in each case, ought one to deploy them so as to produce an interpretation of
the way a people lives which is neither imprisoned within their mental
horizons, an ethnography of witchcraft as written by a witch, nor
systematically deaf to the distinctive tonalities of their existence, an
ethnography of witchcraft as written by a geographer. (ibid:53).
As always with ethnographies, the degree of cooperation from the
various informants varied. Of the dozen or so prisoners I interviewed most
seemed genuinely glad to talk to me. However one was nervous and agreed
to only one interview, and informed me that Castro had spies and
sympathizers in Las Vegas. Another informant, who I regarded as an
excellent source, used to jokingly ask me if I worked for the CIA. I discarded
using a tape recorder after one interview with a group of informants was
interrupted by one of them yelling to another who was speaking (in Spanish)
"Shut up! The tape recorder is on!" Hence pseudonyms are used in this thesis
to protect the informants privacy.
Interviews were conducted in informants apartments, homes, and public
restaurants. Generally three people would be present: myself, the informant,
and the interpreter. As my interpreters were attractive Latino females, I had
to consider the possibility that my informants would be reluctant to reveal
anything that would make them appear weak; but generally, their demeanor
and stories remained consistent whether the interpreter was present or not.
The informants appear genuinely interested in conveying their personal
histories and opinions accurately and truthfully. Etics, emics, experience-near
and experience-far categories aside, inaccuracies are rendered explicable when
one remembers one of the assumptions of my study: this is history from the
point of view of the actors involved.
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Historical Background
Before turning to my case studies, a brief overview of the political
developments of mid-20th century Cuba is appropriate. Cuba gained
independence from Spain after a war (1895-1898) ended in victory for the
Cuban independence forces, aided by the United States. However, US help in
the war precipitated deeper US involvement in Cuban internal affairs. The
Platt Amendment to the Cuban constitution (1901) gave the United States
explicit permission to intervene militarily in Cuba. Preservation of Cuban
independence, property and liberty were cited as grounds for intervention
(Wright, 1991). The US exercised this option and intervened militarily in
1906,1912, and 1917. Cuba developed as a constitutional democracy, but
experienced periods of military rule alternating with civilian control.
In 1933, Cuban strongman Gerardo Machado was overthrown in a coup
led by army sergeant Fulgencio Batista. Batista in turn handed the presidency
over to a moderate civilian, Ramon Grau San Martin. However, Batista
overthrew San Martin four months later and remained an influence in
Cuban politics for the next two decades, serving as president (1944-1948). After
a period of civilian rule, (1948-1952) Batista launched another coup on March
10, 1952. This time a wide array of political parties, which had been
anticipating the upcoming elections, opposed him (Wright, 1991). Clandestine
cells grew out of both major political parties (the Authenticos and the
Qrtodoxosl and university students formed the Directorate Revolucionario
(Revolutionary Directorate, or DR) to oppose Batista. Strikes, propaganda, and
urban demonstrations became common.
In 1953, a young Ortodoxo lawyer named Fidel Castro launched an
armed attack on the Moncada army barracks in Santiago, Cuba. The attack
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failed and Castro was captured, but Castro gained instant national celebrity.
After a 15 month imprisonment Castro was granted amnesty and left for
Mexico, where he organized an invasion force. This force became known as
the 26th of July Movement, in commemoration of the date of the Moncada
barracks attack. With this force, Castro returned to Cuba and in 1956 launched
a guerrilla war in the Sierra Maestra Mountains.
Castro's force was not the only, or primary, opposition to Batista. The DR
in particular, led a bloody and powerful urban guerrilla campaign against the
dictator. The DR nearly toppled Batista during a daring attack on the
presidential palace that saw the attackers fight their way to the third floor,
where Batista himself was just able to avoid assassination. The ensuing
repression killed much of the DR leadership (Wright, 1991).
Batista's preoccupation with the urban front allowed Castro to
strengthen his position in the mountains without much interference. His
growing power forced Batista to launch a major offensive in 1958 to defeat
Castro's force. The offensive failed, support for Batista crumbled. Batista left
for exile in December of 1958.
In January of 1959 Castro assumed his place as head of the new Cuban
government. During the subsequent power struggle between the various
victorious factions, Castro's group, with the support of the communists,
gained the upper hand. In April of 1961 Castro declared his program to be a
socialist revolution, and in December 1961 he publicly declared himself a
Marxist-Leninist. This announcement helped spark a second war (1961-1966)
during which anti-communist guerrillas unsuccessfully tried to remove
Castro from power.
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The case studies represent men whose experiences varied broadly under
the Batista regime. The story of Jos6 the soldier is the first case. As a young boy
growing up in Havana, Jose learned from his padrino about the evils of
communism and how it sought to destroy their religion and beliefs, both
Catholicism and Abakua (an Afro-Cuban religion). Later when Jose joined the
army, he learned from his fellow soldiers and officers that Castro was a
communist and in league with the Soviets. During those impressionable
years, in the midst of some bloody fighting in Oriente Province against the
Fidelistas, Jose's loyalty had been cemented. When the war ended in
December of 1958, the primary group most closely tied with Jos£ at the timehis army buddies from 22nd Company- had gone over to the guerrilla group
"La Rosa Blanca" to continue the struggle. Jose joined them and would
eventually be imprisoned for his activities.
The second case is that of Victor the guajiro. He had learned since
childhood from his parents about the dangers of communism, and when a
childhood friend formed a regional guerrilla group, Victor joined without
hesitation.
The third study is the case of Carlos, who in 1959 was an idealistic 14 year
old university student in a Catholic school in Havana. Carlos's then evolving
world view centered around Catholicism, with the idea that Castro and
communism were anti-Christian in nature. Communism had early on been
identified to Carlos as a threat to his religion. His father's position as a second
lieutenant in the army of Batista gave Carlos a second identifiable primary
group tie with people holding anti-communist views. A third primary group
source of belief formation came from a small group of his friends who were
Fidelista soldiers forming a cabal to fight the revolution's leftward tilt.
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Influenced by these sources, Carlos joined the "Unidad Anti-Communista"
and was imprisoned for counter-revolutionary activities.
All three (Victor, Carlos and Jose) would eventually be captured,
convicted of terrorism and sentenced to long prison terms. All three would
reject the prison rehabilitation programs as being undignified, farcical affronts
to their deepest beliefs. Now I would like to turn to their stories to show how
this is so.

CHAPTER TWO
JOSE THE SOLDIER
Religion is...a system of symbols which act to establish powerful,
pervasive, and long lasting moods and motivations in m en by formulating
conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions
with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem
uniquely realistic.(Geertz,1973:90).
This now famous description of religion by Geertz aptly describes the
world of Jose, a world rich in symbolism and religious expression. Through
normal enculturation processes from primary group sources such as his
father, padrino, and later his fellow soldiers, Jose internalized a world view
centered around belief in the saints and a perception that communism sought
to replace religion with Marxism. When the new social order of 1959
appeared likely to violate the moral order that Jose had been taught, he saw
no recourse other than armed guerrilla action.
Jose's religious education began in a barrio noted for its religious activity.
The Jesus Maria district of Havana was a poor barrio where Jos6 passed
through his childhood in the 1940s. It was a busy district visited by both rich
and poor alike for one reason: to receive the blessings of the Saints. Jesus
Maria was the home of some of Havana's most knowledgeable and
experienced Santeros, and like many Cubans, Jose and his family grew up
with great faith in them.
The religion known as Santeria is a syncretism of beliefs derived from
Catholicism and the Yoruba religion of Africa brought to Cuba through the
18
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slave trade. When the Nigerian-Yoruba slaves arrived in the new world, they
were deeply influenced by the catholic saints which they identified with their
gods and goddesses. They believed that their gods had died mythical deaths
and had now returned to life in the form of the Catholic saints. Santeria is a
common religion in Cuba, and involves belief in the powers of the Yoruba
Orishas fdeitiesl. now syncretized as Catholic saints. The central tenants of
santeria are the worship the saints, observation of their feasts, obedience to
their commands and to conduct their rituals. In exchange, followers gain
supernatural powers, protection from evil, and the ability to predict and
influence the future (Gonzalez-Wippler, 1982:ix). Santeria in Cuba also goes
by the name Lucumi.
There are three main sects in the Cuban variant of Santeria. The first is
the Lucumi. or santeria proper. It is the most common. The second sect is
known as Palo-Mavobe or Palo Monte, and traces its origins back to the Bantu
tribes of the Congo. The third sect is called the Abakua. which has as its core
an all male secret society, and its followers are known as nanigos. The
nanigos trace their ancestry back to the Efik of the Niger delta
(Murphy,1988:32). Many whites considered the nanigos to be political
subversives and gangsters, in part due to the inordinate secrecy associated
with the sect, and also because the Abakua had as its stronghold some of the
poorer and crime ridden barrios in Havana- Belen, Manglar, Cayoguesa, and
Jesus Maria (ibid 34). There was also a certain amount of political rivalry
between the Abakua and the Palo-Mavobe. which centered around mutual
and conflicting accusations of the use of black magic.
It was here in Jesus Maria that Jos6 and his family lived. They were of
African ancestry and were followers of the Abakua. Before he was even born,
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it had been determined that the "Orisha" (guardian saint) Saint Lazarus
would protect Josd. "Lazaro" is also known as Babalu-Aye, and aside from his
kindness and compassion was famous for helping the sick (GonzalezWippler, 1982:124). Saint Lazarus was also protecting Jose's grandparents.
Sometime between the ages of 7-10, Jos6 had been watching a parade
during Armed Forces day. As the soldiers marched by, a stranger came up to
Jose and gave him two pesos and a packet of leaflets to hand out. The leaflets
were from a group called the Accion Revolucionario Guitera (Guitera
Revolutionary Action). Jose was happy to get the pesos and began distributing
the leaflets. Stamped on the leaflets were the "Hoz y un mattia" (hammer and
sycle).
Another man stopped Jose and asked him from where he got the
propaganda. Today, Jose believes that this second man was a member of
BRAC- the Cuban secret police. Jose explained to him what happened and the
man took the leaflets away. When Jose went home that day, he told his father
and padrino what had happened.
Jose's padrino (godfather) was a man named Roberto ValdezMontenegro. He was a man who Jos£ looked up to and respected for his
wisdom. Valdez-Montenegro was the jefe of an agricultural union and was
widely respected in the community for his ability and leadership qualities.
The padrino's Saint was Santa Barbara, the goddess of war.
His father and Padrino began explaining to him that the m an who gave
him the money was a communist. The padrino began explaining to Jose the
dangers of communism. "El terrorismo del communismo". Not only was
communism a threat to family and country, the Padrino said, but it was a
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threat to our religion. Jose was too young to understand much about politics,
but he w ould remember what his Padrino had taught him.
Cars of the rich would arrive at all hours of the day in Jesus Maria, and
policemen, soldiers and their wives, rich whites, blacks, literally people from
all walks of life would arrive to seek the blessings and protection of the
Santos through the help of the santeros. Trucks with chickens and other
animals earmarked for religious ceremonies were a common sight. Jose and
his 18 brothers and sisters (his father had married more than once) quietly
passed into their teens in this poor but exciting neighborhood.
By the mid 1950's it was obvious that the nation faced a political crisis.
Although he was becoming increasingly isolated, Batista support was
strongest in the Afro-Cuban community and among the practitioners of
Santeria. Jose had gone through his asiento ceremony at age 16, (a rite of
passage marking the transition to adulthood) where he had been initiated
into fuller secrets of the Abakua sect, and now could interpret political events
in the light of his newly acquired wisdom. Many observers (Bonachea and
San Martin, 1974:132) agree that among the believers, there was a diversity of
opinion on how to interpret the political developments. The 1957 palace
attack sent a wave of alarms through the santeria community: Batista was
supposed to be infallible and had the mission of leading Cuba, but only if he
had the protection of the Saints. Some sent carved wooden profiles of the
caudillo that had been blessed to the palace to help protect him. Jose says that
Batista was under the personal protection of Santa Barbara, who was one of
the most powerful of all the saints, and had her full backing. Others
wondered if the attack was a message from the Saints to step down. Some
anthropology students were believed to be the source of this rum or (ibid:132).
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By this time Josd's life had changed dramatically. In 1956 at the age 17,
Josd had joined the army after dropping out of trade school due to his families
economic difficulties, which arose after his father died from injuries suffered
in an industrial accident. He had been sent to Oriente Province and put on a
mortar team. By late 1958, the battalion was holed up for the decisive battle.
In the beginning back in 1956, things had been quite different. Jose was
trained as a field soldier and sent to a field unit which participated in the early
counterinsurgency actions against Castro. Back then they had Castro's
guerrillas on the run. The 22nd Company, 1st Battalion, which Jose was a
member of, had ranged across Oriente province, always tracking the elusive
subversives.
Josh's battalion was commanded by Angel Sanchez Mosquera. Although
there is widespread agreement that among other things, Batista's army
suffered from poor leadership and an almost universal reluctance to
aggressively sweep deep into the Sierra on anti-guerrilla missions, this was
not true of all units. Sanchez Mosquera is reported to have been one of the
few officers who penetrated deep into the mountains, engaging in violent
ambushes and counter ambushes (Bonachea and San Martin,1974:104). Jos£
says that Sanchez-Mosquera was always out in front of the troops, and was
protected by Santa Barbara (Goddess of war, patron of fire, thunder and
lightning; she who brings victory over enemies and all difficulties). Jose's
mortar section had seen much combat supporting the infantry companies
during these search and clear operations in the mountains. It was here that
Jos£ came under his baptism of fire, an action in which three of his fellow
soldiers died.
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22nd Company itself was "devoted to" (under the protection o f ) the
Virgin de Cobre, who doubled as the patron saint of Cuba as well. In order to
gain further protection from the saints, and to purify their weapons, Jose and
his fellow soldiers would perform magical spells called Ebbos. Using candles,
water coconuts and candy, they performed rituals that furthered their military
objectives through the help of the saints.
During the campaigning Josd would wear a crucifix around his neck, the
army's "Viejo Poncho" (old Poncho) bulldog patch sewn firmly on his
shoulder. The dog on the patch itself, "Viejo Poncho" was affectionately
known as "chief of the army" and was under the protection of Santa Barbara.
On his arm Jose had a tattoo of Christ drinking from the holy grail. Other
soldiers wore necklaces of red and white beads symbolizing Santa Barbara
(Chango) the god of war, or yellow ones representing the Virgin of La Caridad
(Ochun). Black necklaces represented Saint Lazarus, white ones Obatala (the
equivalent of Jesus) and white and blue ones Yemana (life).
While still in training, Jose had already been instructed in classes
organized to discuss the necessity of defending the nation and the
constitution from communist infiltration and sabotage. Now in the sierra,
Jos£ learned from his fellow soldiers and the officers, more about politics and
the dangers of communism. Specifically, how Castro and the rebels were in
league with the Soviets. Jos6 says that they intercepted radio messages and
found documents that proved Soviet complicity with the rebellion.
Aside from the communists, Josd was also aware of the mysterious
powers of a large black bird called "Latinosa" that lived in the Sierra. Latinosa
fed on the dead, but only after a small white bird called "La Carrida" tested the
carrion for him by eating the eyes. If La Carrida did not die, it meant that it
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was safe for Latinosa to eat. It was potentially dangerous for humans to touch
Latinosa. because he did have mysterious powers and was also a symbol of
God. Latinosa would get violently sick and vomit if touched by humans,
because they were alive and he could only come into contact with the dead.
Jos6 and the other soldiers maintained a healthy mutual respect with
Latinosa whenever he was encountered during section battle drills.
These section battle drills had been unable to eliminate the enemy
columns. Jose knew that the peasants had been helping Castro all along, and
because of that, the battalion was in its current predicament.
During that decisive month of December 1958, Jose's section was
surrounded. The company had was separated from the rest of the battalion,
which was holed up in Moncada barracks, Santiago de Cuba, several miles
away. By December 12,22nd company had been entirely cut off on all sides by
the rebel army and had been reduced to using all their mortars in a series of
heavy bombardments in order to keep the rebels from closing with and
destroying them. The fighting went on for 4 days, and by December 15, out of
the original 178 men in the company, 8 were dead and close to 40 wounded,
some seriously. Four Lieutenants had been ambushed and killed that day
while trying to find a way out of the trap. Jose and his fellow soldiers were
very worried.
It was Captain Amando Acosta who betrayed the company and tricked
the majority into surrendering to the rebels. Fidel had Acosta in his back
pocket - Jos6 was certain of that. But only some- Jos£ estimates about 80surrendered. The Other 50 -odd , veterans like Josd and his friends, would
not. On the night of the 15th, they managed to force their way out of the trap.
Armed with a Thompson .45 caliber submachine gun and four Colt .45 caliber
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semi automatic pistols, Josd and four other soldiers quickly moved northwest
across the countryside.
Three years later and several hundred miles to the west, Jose and his
friends were again in uniform. Only this time they were the guerrillas.
Castro's trium ph in January of 1959 had left Jos6 and his fellow Batista
soldiers desperate. Those who had escaped the destruction of 22 Company had
drifted back to Havana or to their families and homes in the countryside. Jos£
had first stopped off at a sympathetic peasant's home. The peasant gave him
some civilian clothing and a guitar case. Dressed as a civilian and toting a
Thompson gun in his guitar case, Jos£ boarded a train from Santiago and
arrived in Havana about a week later. Jose had a wife and relatives living in
Havana, but it was too dangerous to stay at his home or with relatives. But
he went to her home to talk to her one last time before disappearing. He told
her straight out that if he were caught he would probably be shot. Jose told his
wife to pray for him and left.
In addition to the apolitical civilian clothes that the peasant had given
him, Josd had received green pants and a white t-shirt. The clothes were in
style with Castro's fighters, who were now entering Havana in triumph. They
would help Jose blend into the city, no longer dressed as a Batista soldier, but
dressed as a revolutionary.
Jos6 could not return to his pre army life -before the war he had been a
carpenter apprentice- without documentation. But he knew his barrio and
knew who would be sympathetic to the cause. He kept in close contact with
several other survivors of 22 Company. For a while they had lived in the
streets of Havana, eating garbage and participating in Anti-Castro
demonstrations. Jos6 would arrange to meet secretly with his wife and family
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members. They would give him food, money and clothes. Sometimes Jose
w ould sleep in the homes of sympathizers, other times in the streets. Soon
Jos£ had gotten involved with an anti Castro group called the "AAA". (Most
likely the Triple A of Sanchez Arango). Jose no longer remembers w hat the
initials stood for, but thinks that it might have been "Alliencia
Anticommunista de Los Americas". AAA was a creation of the old
Authentico party. After Batista's 1952 coup that overthrew the authenticos,
that party formed two clandestine organizations to oppose the dictatorship:
AAA and the Authentic Organization. AAA was led by Aureliano Sanchez
Arango, Mario Escoto, Pepe Utera and Mario Villar Roces. They began
operating against Castro as soon as his communist intentions became
apparent. AAA had close ties with Latin America's democratic left, and aside
from former soldiers like Jos£, it drew the support of university students.
AAA worked in alliance with a parallel guerrilla group called La Rosa
Blanca. Rosa Blanca was run by an ex-Batista general named Pedraza who was
in exile in Miami. An ex-captain from Castro's army who went by the name
of "Cara Linda" commanded the AAA urban section that Jose belonged to.
Jose says that operationally, the two groups acted as one, combined they had
maybe 400 members, roughly 200 in each group. They operated 2 main fronts,
one in Havana and one in the Pinar Del Rio mountains. Smaller fronts
existed in other regions of the country. Aside from their ties to General
Pedraza in Miami, they were also supported by the United States base
commander at Guantanamo bay, an officer named Mckenzie. A base cook had
introduced Mckenzie to Jos£ and several other representatives of the
organization. Mckenzie predicted that communism would eventually die all
around the world, told them to hold out and keep faith. Mckenzie gave them
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money, some M-3 submachine guns, and most importantly, a small printing
press. With the printer, the group was able to set up another method of
provisioning themselves. They returned to Havana and began printing war
bonds, which they would in turn sell to local merchants who they knew stood
to lose everything if Castro went ahead with his drive to socialism. Jos6 says
that most of the rich had fled to Miami, he reports that the merchants who
supported the movement were middle class in nature.
They also began printing leaflets and other forms of propaganda. The
leaflets would be targeted at parents and middle class students. The leaflets
w ould state that if communism triumphed, then the rights of parentage
would be taken away and children would be indoctrinated by the state.
Communism would pit father against son, mother against daughter. Jos6 and
his fellow activists would load the leaflets up in a vehicle and speed down the
street, heaving bundles out the window at concentrations of people
whenever the tactical situation permitted it.
Often at university demonstrations, an inside cadre would be stationed
in the crowd when the leaflets were dropped to observe the target audience's
reactions. This was a role that Jos6 played on more than one occasion, and it
was how the movement identified and recruited new members. If any of the
students were overheard to be talking sympathetically about the leaflets or the
movement, Jos6 would survey the situation. Based on his appraisal of the
risks and suitability of the prospects, he would approach and announce that
he was a member of the organization. They too could join the struggle if they
were willing to die. Jos6 would tell them straight out that he was in the group
because he had made that commitment to die if it were necessary. Only those
who w ould pledge this death oath were accepted.
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The new recruits were given easy and non-dangerous tasks at first:
painting slogans on walls, delivering messages, throwing pamphlets, acting as
informants. It would only be after the neophytes had completed a "hard
action" that they would be fully admitted into the trusted inner circle of the
cadre. A hard action was a rite of passage that consisted of armed action
usually in the form of an assassination or commando attack. Jos£ gives this
example: The organization had become aware that two informants named
Jaime and Basquez had infiltrated them. The two were employed at the
telephone company. Jose asked one of his contacts, a man named Loco Bringa,
to arrange a meeting with them.
At the central park where they were to meet, a lone m an stood at each
corner: Jos£, Loco Bringa, and two new men who were going through their
first hard action. The two new men were armed and they had orders to kill
Jaime and Basquez. A car pulled up , but all four of the urban guerrillas
noticed two cars following the first. The two younger m en panicked and fled,
throwing there weapons away. Jose took off also, but he recognized as his
primary duty the recovery of the weapons, he accomplished this and also
escaped undetected. Later the two nervous young men would go on to
complete a "hard action" and become distinguished and respected
com m andos.
Josd cites as his rite of passage as having been his baptism of fire in the
Sierra Maestra during the Batista-Castro war. Three of Josh's fellow soldiers
died in that shootout.
AAA and Rosa Blanca operated with the cellular structure common
w ith urban guerrilla groups. A cell would comprise three people all with
fictitious nombres de guerre for security purposes. They might not know a
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single other member of the organization except for their one outside contact.
This cellular structure ensured that if anyone were caught, he could only give
away three other individuals (his two cell mates and the contact). Jose states
that AAA had 3-5 person cells. Josh's cell had three persons, two m en and a
woman. Jos6 went by the name "Mongito" (a diminutive slang name for
Raymond). Josd's primary role was to be a contact with the guerrilla "Focos"
(secure base camps deep in the backcountry) in Santa Clara, Pinar del Rio and
other rural areas. It was due to this role that he came to the conclusion that
the group had 400 odd members, and through this role he became familiar
with the cellular structure of the group as a whole.
The female member carried leaflets and was involved in propaganda
dissemination. For these missions, she carried a .38 revolver. Her name was
Mercedes and she was very brave and very pretty, and was devoted to Santa
Barbara. Their outside contact, Loco Bringa, worked with them often.
Another man, the chief, knew the identities of all the cell members in all the
cells and often appeared in person to give orders. On occasion he would use
runners. As Jos£ knew more than three outside persons the cell was not
hermetically sealed, but it operated for well over two years without detection.
Jose maintains that Castro formed the CDR’s -Committees to Defend the
Revolution- after AAA/Rosa Blanca disrupted one of his university speeches
with firecrackers and "Communism will take your children" leaflets. People
were rounded up and arrested for this action, but the government dragnet
failed to catch any of the actual perpetrators.
From then on , AAA/RB proselytized hard in corporate groups that they
felt Castro was making inroads into- labor for example. Josh’s group had also
now upped the level of campaigning to sabotage- they began burning factories
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down. They would tip off the inside cadre first, so that they could escape
unharm ed, and then firebomb the target factory.
Jos6 says that not many people liked to work with him because of his
propensity for getting involved in risky military situations. Although he had
first learned about communism when he detected Accion Revolucionario
Guitera (ARG) in his neighborhood, it was Josh's involvement w ith the
Armed Forces had exposed him to the military ethos. He continued with this
military style orientation while with the AAA. On one occasion soldiers came
to the house of a 17 year old AAA member to arrest the youth. A shoot-out
occurred, and the boy escaped with a bullet wound in the leg. A sympathetic
doctor rendevouzed with them at a bar called "El Gangrejito" (the crab) and
operated on the youth, Jos6 was posted as guard outside when a black Cadillac
pulled up. A shoot-out ensued, leaving the doctor and the youth dead. Jos6
had wielded and fired his .45 pistol and fled to his barrio. State Security
encircled the neighborhood but failed to catch him as he knew the district.
One major blow to the organization occurred around April of 1960 when
a supply ship exploded, killing in Josh’s estimation, 400-500 civilians, some of
them members of the AAA/RB. A once trusted commander in Castro's army,
an American mercenary captain William Morgan, had thrown his lot in with
the AAA and was secretly supplying them from his ship docked at Talla
Pierda harbor. Jos£ says that the authorities knew of the ship, but thought that
it was under government control; they did not realize that Morgan was aiding
the rebels. This source of munitions had served AAA/RB well in the past.
Nobody seemed to know who owned the ship or what country it was from,
but the urban action groups received both rifles and munitions from it. The
ship just blew up one day, probably due to some overheated ammunition. A
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nearby electrical plant was hit hard by the blast, killing some AAA members
who worked there. Josd and his associates ran to the harbor after the
explosions and tried to help retrieve bodies out of the sea. After this
occurrence, their quantity of supplies was severely restricted.
In early 1962 Jos6 became one of "Los Ouemados” (The Burned Ones).
Los Ouedamos were those people who's cover had been blown and who were
now identified by the government as with the rebels. Jos6 had been staying in
a safe house in Havana that was protected by the saints. A small figurine of a
rooster stood behind the door, along with the Viejo Poncho shoulder tab.
Between the rooster and Viejo Poncho was a plate with a coconut on it. This
was an offering to the powerful Ellegua, messenger of the Orishas and
guardian of the doors. Without the consent of Ellegua, nothing could be
accomplished. Josd says that the porceline rooster acts as a lookout and if the
rooster crows three times, it meant that you were going to be betrayed. Jos£
says that the local CDR had been watching him and had their suspicions, a
CDR member then caught Jos6 moving some weapons into his house. The
informant looked in Josh's window and saw him with a FAL rifle, the
tomm ygun and his .45 pistol. Jose's female cousin was w ith him; (his padrino
had already been imprisoned with a 25 year sentence for being a Batista
accomplice) they bundled the weapons up tied them to a rope, hauled them
up on the roof and Jos£ took off, traveling on the roofs of the interconnected
city dwellings.
A rendezvous was arranged and a Chevy Bel Air picked up Jos6 and the
weapons, and drove them to Santa Clara. There he stayed for two days w ith a
contact. On the third day, he began walking with another Ouem ado named
Bernardo to the Lomas del Pan Mountains. They had different contacts at
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various points in the mountains, but there was always plenty of mutual
suspicions as infiltrators were common.
A 15 m an guerrilla column linked up with them. Heavily staffed by ex
military from the old Army of Cuba, they had their own ways of sorting the
infiltrators from the legitimate reinforcements and recruits. Castro’s
infiltrators did not have the same professional military experience as the exBatista soldiers, nor the concomitant military attitude or aptitude. Aside from
ex-military, hacendados (landowners) and well-to-do educated elements
formed the backbone of the column, whereas the infiltrators were generally
uneducated urban workers who could display little of the genuine ethos or
values of the true Freedom Commando.
Josd remembers that life as a guerrilla was much more difficult than that
as a soldier in a regular army. They did not have access to proper medical
attention or any of the other logistics associated with garrison life. Now they
were the hunted. They were outnumbered by the increasing legions of
miliciano and regular soldiers that were committed to the campaign. The
guerrilla column was known as "La Rosa Blanca" (The White Rose) and had
approximately 150 fighters. The name was derived from a poem written by
the great Cuban hero Jose Marti:
Cultivo una rosa blanca
en junio como enero para el amigo sincero
que me da su mano franca...
cultivo una rosa blanca
I grow a white rose
in June like in January, for a sincere friend
who gave me a generous hand...
I grow a white rose
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They were armed with the ubiquitous FAL rifles, Garands, M-3 "grease
guns" and Josh's favorite, the Thompson SMG, that both sides had used
throughout the conflict. The final arms shipment of FAL's from Belgium to
Batista had been appropriated by La Rosa Blanca and was now the main
weapon of the guerrilla force. In addition to using the FAL, fos£ kept his
beloved Thompson and his .45. "I would let them go for nothing" is how he
puts it.
The Virgin of Cobre was the'patron saint of La Rosa Blanca. Josd knew
that all the saints were against Castro, but the communists drew supernatural
power from the evil "Cazuela" sect of Palo Mayobe. Castro had kept his
communist intentions hidden, but once it was out in the open, the only way
he could maintain power was by turning to black magic. Hence, on assuming
state control, Castro had made a pact with the evil forces of the African Palo
Mayobe mafia. Because Castro had dictatorial powers, Josd says that he
(Castro) was able to use human sacrifices to appease the supernatural powers
of the Palo-Mavobe. Castro's political power enabled him access to whatever
sacrifices were necessary to muster up the most potent of black magic
available, thus making it exceedingly difficult to defeat him.
On the sleeves of their uniforms, the column members wore either a
white band with the red and blue letters "AAA" emblazoned on them, or a
simple patch depicting a white rose. Other than that it was difficult to
distinguish them from Castro's soldiers: military boots, olive green uniforms,
baseball style campaign caps. They would often remove their insignia to
confuse the enemy during infiltrations and other black operations. The
columns were highly nomadic and never had any permanent home bases,
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this meant that infiltrators who deserted could never report their location or
where they w ould be next.
Jos6 says that the column mimicked Che's style of guerrilla warfare. For
security purposes everybody used pseudonyms. They were not organized into
perm anent platoons or companies, but ad hoc task forces. They had no
artillery or mortars, the FAL (a 7.62mm select fire rifle with a 20 round
magazine) was their most powerful weapon. They were primarily organized
as an irregular force of light infantry. The column contained no female
mem bers.
Jos£ says that the peasants of the Pinar del Rio were sympathetic to their
cause and would help the Rosa Blanca. They would affectionately refer to the
peasants as "Los Guajiros". Also there were plenty of sugar farms, pig farms
and fruit haciendas in the surrounding areas, and the hacendados were their
natural local base of support, as they were the social class that stood to lose the
most under Castro. It didn't take long before the government confiscated the
haciendas, robbing the column of a cooperative source of food and supplies.
The column conducted psychological operations w ith the regional
guajiros, explaining to them how communism would destroy the country
and suppress religion. Leaflets with these ideas were also distributed.
Reinforcements arrived primarily in the form of Los Ouemados sent from
the urban front.
By 1965 they were holed up in the wilds of the Pinar del Rio mountains.
Jos6 knew that an enemy force of several thousand men was tracking them
down, and once again, like in December of 1958, Jos6 and his comrades were
desperate. Increasingly, they would have to fight their way out of
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encirclements, and to steady their nerves while going into the attack, they
w ould sing "Linden Basol".
A las villas valientes Cubanos
a occidente nos mande el deber
de la patria arrojar los tirando
a la carga moir o veneer.
De Marti la memorias dorada que los llena de intenso fuegor
y nos envia la furgida espada de Maceo el caudillo en Basol.
From the valiant Cuban towns
to the west duty sends us
from our homeland we fling them away
to the charge we die or triumph
from Marti the golden memory
that fills us with intense furor
and he sends us the forged sword
of Maceo the caudillo in Basol.

Finally, in much the same way that 22nd Company was destroyed, the
column was encircled and began to prepared for its final battle. They looked to
their leader, Captain Bernardo Corrales, for the solution. He w ould know
what to do.
Bernardo was a leader of almost legendary stature, and Jose and the other
guerrillas had great faith in him. Bernardo had been a member of Castro's
rebel army, but had grown disillusioned with the course of the revolution's
growth. A nationalist and a democrat in the tradition of Jose Marti, Bernardo
joined the counter-revolution because of the regime's totalitarian tendencies.
He was a real fighter, "muv guapo" as Jos£ says. Bernardo was also devoted to
the Virgin of Cobre.
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The role of insurgent leader requires one to be capable of forming cross
cutting alliances between different social groups (Greene, 1990:52). In
Bernardo's case, he was coordinating rural and urban groups, guajiros and
hacendados. people of different religions and races, and most delicately, exBatista soldiers and ex-guerrillas from the 26th of July Movement, the DR,
and the Second Front of Escambray. The section gathered close as Bernardo
outlined the plan.
They would take the captured miliciano uniforms, put them on and just
walk through enemy lines. It was a bold, and potentially suicidal plan, but
Jose felt that Bernardo was worth following.
The guerrilla column split up into small groups in order to exfiltrate
through the enemy positions. Bernardo, Jose, and three other soldiers,
dressed as government militia, walked through enemy lines unchallenged.
They avoided confrontations in this way and arrived at the town of San
Cristobal. In town, a militiaman recognized Bernardo. Bernardo was quick
w ith his submachine gun and got off the first shots, but then fell badly
wounded in a hail of bullets. The other guerrillas scattered.
Due to the severity of his wounds, Bernardo was taken to the local
hospital. Jose and his comrades got word of where Bernardo had been taken
and were unwilling to leave him there. The guerrillas regrouped and
returned to the hospital with the intention of liberating their w ounded
comrade. 15 members of La Rosa Blanca. Jose among them, entered the
building and spread out, searching for Bernardo. A militiaman discovered
what was happening, and one of the guerrillas shot him in the head, killing
him instantly. Bedlam ensued. The militia poured in reinforcements
immediately, and the Rosa Blanca was forced to abort their plan to liberate
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Bernardo. The guerrillas separated, and soon Jos£ and his friends were having
difficulty evading their pursuers. A shoot-out occurred, and five of the
guerrillas were killed outright. With the column being destroyed in the
subsequent massive counterinsurgency operation, Jose carefully wrapped up
his Thompson and .45, buried them in the forest and disappeared into the
back country. Most of the column were captured and imprisoned. He knew
the rules of warfare in this struggle: if he were caught armed, it meant
execution by firing squad. He wandered down to the lowlands and made his
way back to Havana Province, where he was apprehended in Marianao
District. Jose was taken to Havana, where he was incarcerated in the State
Security prison on 5th Avenue and Calle 14 in the Mirimar District.
In Jose's opinion, the defeat of La Rosa Blanca can be attributed to two
main factors. First, the war was fought on two levels, materially and
spiritually. In the spiritual world of the Orisha Saints and other supernatural
forces, Fidel's alliance with the dangerous powers of the Cazuela cannot be
minimized. Josd agrees with his friend Barbaro that in order for Castro to die,
one of the 13 most powerful Babalaos (high priests) would have to die also.
Not one was at that point prepared to step forward and be sacrificed. While
others believed that Castro was in alliance with the powerful Eleggua
(Gonzalez-Wippler,1982:109), Josd maintains that it was actually the Palo
Mayobe Cazuela sect that gave aid to Castro. Jose says that all the saints were
with the Commandos, but Castro's ability to use human sacrifices offset their
support. Batista was only able to escape to Spain with the help of Santa
Barbara.
Second, in the physical world, the Freedom Commandos most powerful
supporter, John F. Kennedy, had abandoned them. Whereas Castro had the

38

full material and economic support of the Soviet Union, the commandos
were left without a superpower backing them. Kennedy had come to an
agreement with Castro after the October missile crisis, and after that supplies
dried up. Combining those two powers- the Soviets and the African PaloCazuela. produced a force that the Freedom Commandos, even with the
backing of the Saints, were unable to defeat.
The story of Jose has so far traced the intellectual journey of a young
m an who increasingly combined his religious views with a strong military
ethos. These religious ideas and military values were developed from
intense, primary group relationships with such figures as the padrino and
Bernardo Corrales. He came to see the struggle itself as more than just
political in nature, but as a cosmic, historic crusade. These loyalties and
beliefs, as we will see, would play a decisive role in Josh's subsequent refusal
to participate in the reeducation program after being sent to prison.
Before turning to Josh's imprisonment, I will now discuss the events
leading to the capture of my other case studies, Victor and Carlos.

CHAPTER THREE
VICTOR THE GUAJIRO
Like Jose, Victor grew up in a family that had a strong tradition of anti
communism. This would, in a sense, pre-adapt him to life as a guerrilla. Yet
there are some important differences between Jos6 and Victor. Whereas Jose's
entry into the guerrilla resistance was simply a continuation of a military
lifestyle and struggle, Victor had been a civilian with no prior experience in
the armed forces. Victor's sedentary, civilian pre-guerrilla life contrasts
sharply with the nomadic and regimented life that Jose had led with the
battalion. Underneath these apparent lifestyle differences, the two men
shared certain similar values, most noticeably strong religious beliefs.
Victor was 40 years old when the revolutionary forces entered Havana.
At that time, he was a "guajiro" fcampesinol who made a living harvesting
sugarcane and was living in the Santa Gertrudes community in Matanzas,
which was built around a small sugar mill.
Victor had learned about communism from his father who was the
owner of a Fincita ( small parcel of land). He identifies himself and his family
as guajiros and says that they were poor. Victor’s father had taught him when
he was about 9-10 years old that communism bred nothing but poverty and
misery, and if the communists ever came to power they w ould enslave the
town, suppress their religion and replace it with communism. The
communists were known to be murderers who bombed schools and
39
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participated in other acts of sabotage. Victor says that he was trained as a child
never to accept candy from a communist or talk to one. He knew about the
1917 revolution in Russia and was alert for signs of it occurring in Cuba.
When his sister began a romance with a communist, she risked being
disowned by the family. The suitor came by on his horse one day to court her,
and the father sternly told the young man not to even bother dismounting;
he was told to never return and that was the last Victor ever saw of him.
Victor says that he knew Castro was a communist from the beginning.
The Americans and many Cubans were fooled, but Victor knew better. On the
8th of January 1959 Castro gave his first speech, and Victor could read between
the lines: communism.
W hen Castro took power, Victor immediately began participating in
political action against the regime. His role was to get young people together
for political awareness meetings to alert them to the fact that Castro was a
communist. There were about 60 people in the youth group that Victor led
and helped organize. There, Victor led discussion groups which centered on
the theme that if communism triumphs in Cuba, there would be no private
property or religion and that everything would be managed by the state. At
this time the group had no arms so they tried to appropriate them from
armories and barracks. Victor was also feeding, hiding and housing guerrillas.
A younger man who he had known as a child, Martin Campos, led a guerrilla
band in the nearby woods. Martin had been a member of the 26th of July
Movement, leading a small column of the rebel army fighting Batista's troops
around Matanzas. He had taken up arms again now that the regime was
showing its true orientation. Martin Campos heard that Victor was
organizing against the government and an alliance developed between the
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two groups. Campos would send little groups of men to Victor and Victor
would in turn hide them in a little colony in the sugarcane fields he had
hidden away. Martin Campos himself hid there one night. Other men from
the pueblo would come to Victor for asylum, he would send them to Martin.
The Martin Campos guerrillas were a column of the anti-Castro
Movement of Revolutionary Recuperation, or MRR. The leader of the MRR
was a m an named Manuel Artime, who during the revolution had been a
competent and respected member of the Agrupacion Catolica Universitaria
(ACU), a group which had opposed Batista. In 1958 Artime served in the
Sierra Maestra in Fidel Castro's rebel army. He went on to be put in charge of
land reform in Oriente province and organized the Rural Commandos with
the help of his friends from the ACU. Now actively conspiring against the
government, Artime had gone on to lead the MRR and its student front, the
Revolutionary Directorate, in armed guerrilla action (Montanar,1981:198).
The movement was supported by the CIA by channels originally
established by Juan Antonio Rubio Padilla, a member of the ACU. The CIA
ties with the ACU were direct, close and organized; they were less so with
MRR (and other groups like the Second National Front of Escambray and the
November 30 Movement). Through their links with the ACU, the MRR
would eventually become one of the CIA's main allies. The religious nature
of the MRR had limited historical precedents in Cuba; Montenar (1981:198)
likened them to the Cristeros of the Mexican revolution. Unlike groups such
as UAC, they had only weak ties to the non-communist elements in the
government at that time (Montaner, 1981:198).
Victor describes Martin as "more brave and energetic than educated or
intelligent"; he was a soldier at heart, not a politician. Martin was perhaps 33
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years old in 1959. According to Victor, his only political beliefs were "contra la
dictadoria" (against the dictatorship). They had known each other since
childhood, and Victor considered him to be a good friend. Like Victor, Martin
came from a poor guajiro family which worked a fincita: his father and son
would die along with him in the ensuing war. Martin’s background fits well
with w hat many observers (Greene,1990:58) had already observed: that rightist
and centrist insurgent leaders ( I.E. Martin Campos, Osvaldo Ramirez,
Bernardo Corrales) are drawn primarily from middle and lower classes and
are sociologically representative of their organizational base. In contrast,
Marxist or leftist revolutionary leaders -Fidel Castro and Che Cuevara for
example- tend to be better educated and from a higher social class than their
followers (ibid:57).
Both sides (The government and the counter-revolution) had infiltrated
informants into the others ranks: Victor was tipped off by some spies that he
was going to be arrested and fled to Havana. However, State Security was
efficient and in November of 1960, to evade capture, Victor left for the forests
around Mataguay. There he joined the "Grupo Martin Campos" guerrillas.
He was now an armed fighter.
The Martin Campos group had about 200 combatants under arms. The
group operated in a series of platoon sized formations that would unite or
disperse depending on the mission. Because he was older and had experience
as an organizer, Victor was put in charge by Martin of one of these small
platoons that operated as an independent task force.
The column maintained itself economically through a special
relationship that developed with the hacendados of the region. The
hacendados could see the writing on the wall: if Castro solidified his power
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and put through his programs they would lose everything. They came to an
understanding with the Martin Campos group that they (the guerrillas) could
slaughter cattle from their haciendas and that they would in turn overlook it.
This gave the guerrillas a stable supply of meat. The hacendados were also
generous with medicine, money, intelligence reports and other assistance.
Recognizing the socioeconomic bloc that provisioned the insurgency, the
government moved in and confiscated the haciendas. Victor's father had died
several years before, but the sugar mill was still owned by his mother. This
was confiscated and his mother was sent to live with a daughter in Havana.
The government also moved in militia units in large numbers, as well as
several special counterinsurgency units.
The situation for the Martin Campos column was tenuous from then
on. In a secluded wooded area along the north coast of Matanzas, Martin
Campos himself called a meeting in which all 200 guerrillas attended. The
decision was made to split up into small groups of 5-6 combatants and
disperse throughout the countryside. Victor's nephew had joined up also,
and the two of them were assigned to the same commando squad. Dispersal
and retreat are common guerrilla tactics when confronted with a numerically
superior and well organized enemy force. This allows the guerrilla
opportunity to evade capture and makes it extremely difficult to track down
all members of the organization. It also increases the possibility that some of
the squads will remain undetected and be in a position to regenerate the
movement at a later date.
On the negative side, military forces operating below the battalion level
of organization (200-1000 combatants) cannot undertake offensive actions that
can overthrow state power. The retreat to remote areas cuts the guerrilla off
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from contact with the social base, which is the absolute priority objective in a
political war. This separation from the towns frustrated Victor, as it limited
their ability to recruit and conduct what we would describe as psychological
operations with the people.
Deep in the woods, the political orientation among the guerrillas was
simple and by face to face communication. There was no specific political
officer and the older men like Victor would take it on themselves to explain
"porque luchamos" to the younger recruits. They would tell the younger
recruits that the communists would bring the exact opposite of w hat they
preached- Castro promised liberty but brought slavery, he preached respect for
religion but wanted to destroy it. Each guerrilla was issued a cotton armband
with one of three acronyms written on it; M-R-R; DC or DN. these stood for
Movimiento Recuperacion Revolucionario. Democracia Christiano and
Democracia Nacional. respectively. When possible they would paint slogans
on the walls on the outskirts of towns: "Abajo Communismo". "Cuba Si.
Russia No" and other slogans with similar themes.
An urban branch of the MRR called "La Trinchera" (the Trench) was
composed of university students and conducted political activity such as
protesting the visit of the Soviet Vice Premier. Before it was censored, their
newspaper (also called Trinchera) discussed the beliefs of the movement. One
editorial warned that communism denied "human freedom, property rights,
freedom of thought, and family, love and religion." (Suchlicki,1969:98). It
accused the regime of "treachery to the spiritual values of Marti's fatherland."
(ibid:98). "The communists are materialists...the Cuban people and students
are humanists." (ibid:98). The objective after the overthrow of Castro was to
have a "national Christian order based on freedom justice and a youth
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movement based on Christian principles and ideals." (ibid:98). La Trinchera
supported armed urban actions once the struggle had moved to a military
phase (ibid:95-96). The world view and ethos of the movement centered
around this concept of a Christian and democratic crusade against the antiChristian and totalitarian pretender, Fidel Castro. Recognizing the blend of
Christian imagery and democracy that motivated the anti-Castro guerrillas,
the CIA went so far as to propose alerting Cubans of the impending return of
Christ. On the day of the announced second coming of Jesus, a submarine
would surface offshore and secretly set off fireworks in order to help prom pt a
general rebellion against the anti-Christ, Castro (Wright,1991:63).
To deal with the Martin Campos group, The government decided on a
strategy of cordon, search and clear. Several battalion sized militia units
would completely encircle a forest or area where guerrillas were known to
operate, and then special units would be sent in to drive the guerrillas
towards the entrenched soldiers ringing the perimeter. Victor says that when
this would happen he and his squad would become very desperate and then
select a section of the ring to rush, M-3s blazing. Victor said that he knew at
this time the government soldiers were not taking prisoners, so the only
hope of escape lay in these near suicidal shock actions against the encircling
enemy. He remembers that they shot down a section of enemy troops once
and ran off through the bush, only to find themselves slowly being caught up
in the dragnet again.
Victor remembers many little things about war in the mountains. He
chose the facade name "Chin" to use as his nombre de guerre as it was
customary for security purposes to conceal your real identity. Sometimes he
carried an M-l Garand - this was the best gun, says Victor, because the
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communists were afraid of i t It made a large, explosive wound. Other times
they preferred the smaller M-3 "grease gun" when assaulting enemy
positions, due to its massive close range firepower. The light R-2 rifle was
"buena", but the "San Cristobal" sub machine-gun that they got from Santa
Domingo was not so good, because its barrel would overheat and warp easy.
Using these type of weapons and bloody nose tactics, they were able to play hit
and run in this manner for the next 6 months around Mataguay. It was
impossible to ever return to his farm to visit relatives, but since Victor was
not married at the time, he had no one that he was responsible for.
There were no priests or full time religious specialists operating with the
column. Each fighter carried his personal religious icons with him and
conducted his prayers and religious observances quietly and without fanfare.
The Virgin of Cobre, patron saint of Cuba, protected the column. Sometimes
small offerings were made to her, but nothing elaborate like those offered
during pre-war pilgrimages to her shrine in Oriente. Her protection was
needed, because Victor states that shortly after taking power, Castro had been
initiated into a black magic cult by some powerful brujas (witches) sent from
Africa specifically for that purpose. The initiation was conducted in a river in
Matanzas and involved the use of drugs. Every year since then, Castro has,
according to Victor, returned secretly to Africa to meet with powerful witch
doctors, and would use the blood of prisoners during sacrifices. "It's not a
story, everyone in Cuba knows it" says Victor. Manuel, another ex-prisoner
who I interviewed and is friends with Victor, concurs.
The war was going badly. Castro's army killed many of Victor's friends.
Victor in fact estimates that most of the members of the insurgent column
were either killed in action or executed by firing squad. He reports of knowing
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of only 20 of the original 200 insurgents surviving the war. Martin was one of
the last to be tracked down and killed, reportedly in 1966.
On May 28 of 1961 Victor received a message from a runner connected
w ith another squad that truckloads of soldiers were in the region. Victor, his
nephew, and four other men began the days movement and stopped a little
while later in a sugar cane field. Victor stepped back into the bush to relieve
himself -his gear and .38 caliber revolver 20 feet away- when the shooting
suddenly started. Victor's nephew had a Garand and they returned fire with
this. The nephews return fire was unexpectedly effective, from the reaction of
the enemy, they could tell that they had hit somebody. The death of an enemy
soldier in this encounter would later become a key issue in Victor's
subsequent trial and conviction.
The firing slackened off and then ended, but another group of the enemy
was trying to outflank them. Victor's group split up and fled and the four of
his comrades were tracked down and captured by the militia. The nephew
was also captured and imprisoned. (Today he lives in Miami). Victor was
trying to hop a fence when he was surrounded and captured.
Expecting to be executed, Victor had fortunately been captured by a
militia unit commanded by one of his childhood friends. Victor says that this
m an saved many peoples' lives, and still lives in Cuba today.
They were taken to State Security headquarters called "C apitain" in the
small town of Colon. Someone put a gun to Victor's head and told him to
start talking, he was frightened but says he played stupid. When shown
another member of his squad he replied that he knew the m an but was not
associated with him. There someone noticed the armband Victor wore that
read "Democracia Christiano". The soldiers said "get a rope" and put Victor
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up against a tree. The captain who Victor knew, arrived and ordered his men
back, saying that he wanted to talk to Victor in private.
"Guajiro. where did you get that armband?".
"I just saw it lying on the ground and saved it."
"You do well."
Victor says that there was an unspoken understanding between the
captain and him that he was playing dumb. The captain was sympathetic but
could do little for Victor. From there, they were sent to the G-2's
interrogation center in Matanzas.
Like Jose, Victor had a pervasive influence of anti-communism
imparted from primary group sources such as his father. Martin Campos
seemed to play a similar role to Victor as Bernardo Corrales played to Jose: a
friend who's loyalty could not be betrayed. Victor's religious ideas concerning
Castro's participation in African witchcraft impart a cosmic as well as political
dimension to the struggle. Both men had relatives participating in the
campaign with them (Jose's cousin, Victor's nephew). Like Jose, these pre
-existing loyalties and beliefs would keep Victor from joining the political
rehabilitation program while in prison.

CHAPTER FOUR
CARLOS THE STUDENT
When discussing their personalities, Josd is essentially a soldier at heart,
and Victor a guajiro. The third informant is Carlos, a student and an idealist.
Like Jos6 and Victor, Carlos had strong pre-existing primary group ties to anti
communist elements. His religious ideas also imparted a cosmic as well as
political meaning to the war.
In 1959 Carlos was a member of a Catholic youth group. He was 14 years
old at the time, and was enrolled in the Belen Catholic School of Havana.
Carlos dreamed of becoming an engineer one day.
Carlos came from a middle class background. His father had been a
second Lieutenant in the army of Batista and his mother worked for the
Catholic church. They were of African ancestry. His three brothers taught
math, Spanish and architecture in Havana and a sister was studying
languages in Spain before she died. The parents taught them to be true
believers in education and to value personal growth and achievement. The
family had a traditionally Catholic value orientation.
During Castro's guerrilla war, military officers would gather in Carlos's
father's home to discuss the political situation. Although he was now retired,
the father kept in close contact with other officers and Carlos was able to
follow developments in the political situation through them.
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Through friends, acquaintances and self study Carlos furthered his
political education. One book influenced him greatly: La Gran Estafa. It was
written by an ex-communist named Educio Rabines and focused on
communism's influence in Latin America. Carlos also respected another
book by the same author: America Latina, una Continente en Erupcion. (Latin
America, a Continent in Eruption). This book continued with the theme of
communist upheaval in Latin America, and how they were infiltrating
legitimate political parties..
He learned of communism "through practice, not theory." Carlos was
from an educated, middle class background and had come to the conclusion
that any system which was anti-Christian in nature, such as communism,
was bad and wrong. He was shocked at the way Castro was received that
January:
Castro was treated like a God, a messiah. In reality it was profane, they
were treating him like he was Christ, a savior of humanity.
Carlos knew of Marx, Lenin and Marxist-Leninist theory. He knew that
Marx called religion the opiate of the masses. It was while a student in 1959, at
the Belen school, that he would learn something else that would affect his life
irreversibly.
Carlos met quietly one afternoon with some friends of his who had been
guerrillas with Castro in the Sierra Maestra. They warned him that Castro had
been a secret communist during his time in the mountains, and w ould lead
Cuba to tyranny. They admitted to Carlos that even though they were still
members of Castro's revolutionary army, that they had formed an internal
cabal to destroy the communists. They felt betrayed, as they believed that they
had been fighting to bring representational democracy to Cuba. This "Lucha
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Internal" and early factionalism was seen by Carlos as perhaps the last and
best chance to stop communism in Cuba.
Carlos and his friends joined a covert group called UAC ( Unidad Anti
Com m unistal. The UAC was one of 30 separate democratic groups organized
into a coalition called Frente Democratica Nacional. or simply FDN. The FDN
was led by Osvaldo Ramirez, an ex-commander in Castro's army.
While the UAC was organizing, Castro was busy also. Carlos believes
that throughout history, certain ancient symbols with mysterious,
malevolent powers have been exploited by political leaders such as Julius
Caesar and Napoleon to seek control over mankind. Carlos believes that
Castro made a careful study of Hitler and copied his magical way to power.
Carlos states that Castro studied how Hitler sent Himmler on a search
throughout the near east and the Indian subcontinent, looking for these
symbols. Himmler returned with the swastika, a religious symbol from
ancient India with the directions of the crosses' open ends now reversed. The
powerful forces inherent in the swastika had been preserved throughout the
middle ages by monks, who brought it to the Tiber river, where they
reactivated its potency. The power of the swastika gave Hitler clairvoyancy,
and in that respect, Carlos compares Hitler to Jules Verne.
Following Hitler's road to power, Carlos says that Castro went to Ghana
dressed in white with a green sash, in order to collect mystical symbols. He
found these secret symbols, and brought them back to Cuba. These symbols
are incorporated into flags and uniforms, and have the power to attract
people like a magnet.
Carlos believes that Castro also traveled to Haiti, where he embraced the
religion of Voodoo. Castro brought Haitian Voodoo priests back to Cuba with
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him and they help him perform human sacrifices, which solidify his power.
Also according to Carlos, Castro is, by biblical interpretation, a Satan
worshipper.
Carlos came to the conclusion that Castro and the system were choking
Cuba and the peoples rights. At first, Carlos believed in a "Lucha Legal" - a
legal struggle involving propaganda and demonstrations. In 1961 Castro
dropped all pretenses to western style parliamentary democracy and publicly
declared himself a communist/ Marxist Leninist. Carlos quickly realized that
only armed action could save the day. UAC was quick to react. Carlos became
a coordinator for an 8 man team that ran a warehouse where the movement
stored arms, ammunition, boots, shoes, clothing, medicine food and other
provisions necessary to sustain an armed operation against the false regime.
Carlos states that the warehouse received its supplies from the CIA and the
Pentagon, who would ship in the materiel by boat from Florida. Carlos and
his cell would meet the boats at deserted beaches, unload the supplies, and
transport them to the warehouse. There they would oversee the distribution
and provisioning of the field units. When someone from the movement had
been uncovered to the authorities, Carlos's team would take them to the
beach for escape to the safety of Miami. People would move both ways across
the straits of Florida. These infiltration teams played a significant role in the
subsequent urban and rural guerrilla warfare that was soon to spread.
The other way of provisioning the UAC/FDN was by obtaining weapons
from dissatisfied elements within Castro's armed forces. This dual supply
channel (recognition from the CIA/Pentagon, internal cabal from Castro’s
forces) would make it difficult for the regime to isolate and destroy the
movements supply network.
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A partial list of the UAC/FDN arms stockpile in Carlos's warehouse
incudes M-2 carbines, both Thompson and M-3 submachine guns, .45 pistols,
Garand rifles and C-2/3 explosives. Secure channel radio equipment was also
provided, compliments of the US. government.
Training classes were provided on weapons maintenance (particularly
the FAL) machine gun employment, disinformation and propaganda. Carlos
cites this as an example of disinformation: that they would "tip off" the
authorities that a certain police station was going to be attacked, when in
reality they would sabotage aircraft at a remote field. In this way they could tie
up the security forces at distant locations.
During this training Carlos also learned of certain styles of military
organization. He became familiar with the G-l, G-2, G-3, G-4 and G-5
organizational style common with US. influenced forces.
Carlos admits that they were young, inexperienced and made alot of
mistakes in organizing. They were not like the Europeans, who Carlos says
were more experienced in war. But even the CIA was making many mistakes,
as people were new to this type of operation.
"The star of the north was always an inspiration" Carlos says, referring to
the USA. They knew that they could win only with US help. They fought for
representational democracy, patria and liberdad. Eisenhower had always
supported them fully. "He was out to get Castro." says Carlos. As events
would unfold and Kennedy became president, things would change.
There was a small printing press that they kept, and the movement
produced simple leaflets outlining the dangers communism posed to not
only Cuba, but to all of Latin America. The message that the UAC put out was
this: Communism tries to turn people not only into physical slaves, but
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mental slaves, so that they become robots. All rights and liberties will be
stripped away. Communism feeds off of the people in order to inspire
revolution in all of Latin America. Carlos would write short stories and
poems to illustrate these points. In one story, two men, one an ex-guerrilla
from Castro's rebel army, the other an older man, are talking.
"Why did you fight?" the older man asks.
"For freedom." replies the ex-soldier.
"Freedom of what?"
"Freedom of conscience, expression, freedom of the press, economic
liberty."
"I think you were wrong and fought in vain. Communism buries those
liberties, it destroys society, irradicates love honor and respect."
The older man leaves. The ex-soldier slowly starts walking away, lost in
thought. He suddenly stops under a streetlight and comes to a conclusion. He
reaches into his pocket, takes out his red communist party I.D. card and
slowly starts tearing it up. Blood starts dripping from the card and forms a
deep pool, into which the ex-soldier slowly sinks and disappears.
Propaganda leaflets expressing similar themes would be left by the
movement in untied bundles on the roofs of houses, with only a single light
pebble on top of the stack to hold them in place. The wind would pick up later
in the day, blowing the pebble off and scattering the leaflets onto the crowded
streets below, with the UAC/FDN propaganda team by then safely dispersed.
The moment of decision was to come in April of 1961. Brigade 2506-the
invasion force- stormed the beaches at the Bay of Pigs. The UAC, the other 29
groups of FDN, and all democratic forces in Cuba that had been carefully
organized in Castro's armed forces, civil service and all sectors of society
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waited for the radio message from Command X: The order that would set in
motion the general uprising of the united front's organizations to help
Brigade 2506 create the necessary effects in society to replace the false regime.
The message they received was: "STAND BY."
The 2,000 man invasion force was pinned on the beach and after 72
hours forced into captivity. Carlos says that Kennedy promised air support but
none came. Castro, now fully aware of the power of the opposition, went all
out to infiltrate and destroy them.
The missile crisis of October 1962 ended as a strategic political defeat for
the UAC/FDN. Whatever agreements were reached between Kennedy and
Castro had the net effect of markedly reducing the supplies from the US.
Logistically, and politically, the movement was set back.
This deterioration of the situation and the increasing degree of
government pressure on the urban organization made him decide to join the
guerrillas in the mountains. Carlos and his confederates stockpiled
ammunition, medicine and other supplies. They then left Havana in trucks ,
traveled through Matanzas and were now moving through Las Villas.
Destination: to link up with the El Escambray group "Commander Osvaldo
Ramirez" guerrillas.
This force (The Osvaldo Ramirez group) was only one of an estimated
179 armed columns active in the country at this time, comprising over 3,500
armed insurgents (Raul Castro 1970, Valladares 1984:79). Ramirez himself was
perhaps the most famous of the guerrilla leaders, held in awe by the local
peasantry and reportedly the only caudillo who Castro offered amnesty
(Montener,1981:201). The Government sent in the "Battalones de Lucha
Contra Banditos" ( Battalions that fight against Bandits, or LCB's) to track
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them down. A national revolutionary militia of over 100,000 strong was
mobilized to support the LCBs (Mazarr 1990:263). Militia units encircled the
Escambray mountains by setting up a series of manned foxholes and trenches
40-50 yards apart and waiting while special search and clear teams hunted the
rebels down.
For their part, Carlos and his associates were quite sophisticated at this
point. They had special radio equipment, codes and messages. The trucks
were loaded with supplies for the guerrillas. Eight young men, disguised as
militia driving trucks loaded down with ammunition and supplies, slowly
w ound there way through the mountains.
The basic tenants of counterinsurgency doctrine recognize the necessity
to confront the incipient movement politically as well as militarily
(Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, CIA- Contra training manual,
1983). Understanding that guerrilla war is essentially a political war, Castro
was able to compromise the security of the Escambray insurgents through a
series of bribes, quiet negotiations and other political-economic initiatives. A
massive counter-guerrilla operation that included wide scale forced
relocation of guajiros and systematic cordon and search tactics was
implemented. This became known as "the Escambray cleanup." It was in this
type of political climate that Carlos's group found themselves in as they
approached their rendezvous point with the main guerrilla group at the
fringe of the Escambray range.
Along the way they were betrayed and intercepted. G-2 State Security
forces surrounded them, and in the ensuing gunfire Carlos was hurt and
captured. Like Jose, he was taken to the special prison for State Security, and
the Escambray front was destroyed in the ensuing campaign.

CHAPTER FIVE
PLANTADOS
Guerrillas and activists like Jos6, Carlos, and Victor would soon come to
be recognized as a special type of prisoner in the Cuban penal system:
plantados. The word plantado comes from the verb plantar, which means to
stand firm. In this case, it signifies those political and military prisoners who
refused any compromise with the Cuban revolutionary state. Plantados
would include not only violent opponents to the regime (like Jose, Carlos and
Victor) but prisoners of conscience and other people who were not engaged in
armed struggle. Plantados would become a special and altogether new class of
persons in Cuba, created by the prison system of the early 60s. The word
plantado became associated with these prisoners by about the year 1967, when
those prisoners who were incarcerated on the Isle of Pines were transferred
back to Cuba proper and subjected to various measures designed to coerce
them into participating in the State's rehabilitation program. The plantados
refused to do this, and were subjected to a continuation of draconian
measures designed to elicit their cooperation. Although some prisoners
accepted the Government's offer of reeducation and rehabilitation, many
others like Jos6, Carlos and Victor refused and became plantados. Hence they
continued to wear the yellow prison uniform given to the counter
revolutionary inmates and refused the blue uniforms of the common
criminals. As a result they were segregated from the other prisoners.
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The plantados originated out of the guerrilla war and massive
revolutionary mobilization process of the early 1960s.
One of the assumptions of this section is that the plantados beliefs
originated from intense, primary group interaction with family, friends, and
peers before and during the guerrilla movement. The failures of the
government's subsequent rehabilitation program I attribute to an
undervaluing of pre-existing primary group ties by the part of the
government, and an unrealistic belief that secondary groups that are already
detested by the target audience will be viewed as a legitimate source of
political guidance. The rehabilitation programs were a creation of a specific
type of State system - the "mobilization system." The concept of the
mobilization system was first developed by David E. Apter (1963). A
mobilization system can be defined as a sociocultural process involving all
elements in society- from the military to the arts- organized as a task force
with one clear political objective. The consequences of the seizure of State
power by a revitalization movement, whether revivalistic or revolutionary
in nature, is characterized by the appearance of a mobilization system.
Traditional elites can impose a mobilization system also, "the
Counterinsurgency State" in Guatemala during the early 1980s for example.
Richard Fagen (1966) was the first to apply this model to Castro's Cuba:
It is this elite commitment to total exploitation of hum an resources in
the service of revolutionary goals which both indexed and motivated the
transformation of Cuba in less than five years from a standard repressive
dictatorship under Batista to a mobilization system. (Fagen 1966:204-205).
It is my contention that such a system will not be effective in recruiting
genuine converts from the opposition. The rehabilitation program
overvalues the effectiveness of political prosylitizing and too narrowly views
the relationship between the revolutionary vanguard and the target group as

one of simple "consciousness raising." The plantados are a reaction to such
system. The government's hope of being able to use secondary, coercive
groups as a legitimate source of belief transformation when proselytizing
with the politically committed proved to be illusory. I will now turn to the
prison experiences of our case studies to show how this is so.

CHAPTER SIX
STATE SECURITY
The Revolutionary Army Department of Investigations (DIER), or
simply G-2, was in the early 1960's the Cuban state security organization. Later
it would be reorganized and called Departamento de Securidad de Estado
(DSE, or Department of State Security). My informants refer to it as "G-dos"
(G-2) or "Securidad de Estado.'1It falls under the direction of the Ministry of
the Interior and oversees that country's penal system. In the posh Mirimar
district in Havana, G-2 had taken possession of 2 city blocks worth of homes
confiscated from Batista's supporters. A series of tunnels connected the
homes and they now formed a complex security and detention center. Twocar garages without toilets served as jail cells.
The first day at G-2 State Security center was one of interrogation for
Carlos. The first thing State Security tried to do was entice the eight captured
guerrillas to talk and cooperate. They were told that they would not be hurt.
Carlos and the rest remained silent. When it became apparent that they
would not talk the authorities moved on to stage two. The detainees were
now separated and questioned individually. Carlos was put into solitary
confinement with no lights. His toilet was a hole in the ground. He was not
allowed to bathe. He had no bed, so he slept on the floor. The food was
heavily spiced and came in small portions. He lost all sense of time and
could not tell when it was day or night. Three times a day he would be
60

61

interrogated. They kept asking and repeating questions, and finally told Carlos
that he was going to be killed if he did not cooperate.
Trivial and irrelevant ice breaking questions would be initially asked to
get the prisoners used to talking. Questions not concerning the organization
at all. The first serious question asked was "who was the head of the group?"
That was an easy one that had been pre arranged well before: no one was
superior to any one; they took their orders from a mysterious and unknown
messenger.
The next, and most repeated line of questioning dealt with the group's
links to the CIA, Florida and the United States. This represented the power
that Castro truly feared.
Carlos made up lies to placate them. The authorities were apparently
dissatisfied with Carlos's answers so they moved on to stage three. The once
passive officer took out a pistol and put it to Carlos's head. The officer told
Carlos to talk or he would die. Carlos was familiar enough with intelligence
gathering that he was convinced that the officer would not shoot him. At this
point they still wanted information and the officer would get into trouble if
Carlos was shot. Carlos told the guy "Go ahead." The officer hit him and told
him he was crazy.
Three German Shepherds were brought in. Carlos said that the dogs
would bite him enough to cause pain but not enough to cause massive
irreparable damage. The dogs were obviously trained to detain but not rip
apart prisoners. Carlos had dogs at home and knew well enough to not show
any outward signs of fear to the animals. He knew the dogs would kill him
only if the trainer present gave the order. He was also aware that his reactions
were being filmed, and observed by the guards.

Next they brought in cassette tapes of people being shot- Carlos was
certain that they were authentic. They would play the tapes for Carlos with
the clear implication that he was courting with disaster. Carlos's responses
were still unsatisfactory so State Security began leaving internal organs and
hum an hair in his cell. Carlos says he continued to give them false
information, especially when they threatened to torture his parents and
family. He was pistol-whipped in the head for being uncooperative. Some of
Carlos's friends were thrown into the swimming pool w ith chains wrapped
around them. The known CIA personnel from the Bay of Pigs were treated
the worst. Finally, after what turned out to be 30 days Carlos was transferred
to the maximum security prison in Havana known as La Cabana. Eventually,
some documents "from Brazil" turned up in the hands of G-2 which spelled
out all of Carlos's activities with the UAC. Infuriated by the lies Carlos had
told, the authorities shipped him back to G-2 for another 6 months worth of
interrogation.
At the G-2 interrogation center in Matanzas, Victor and his comrades
were kept up all night and interrogated. Victor and the men captured with
him would be separated and interrogated one by one. The interrogators
would return to the isolated prisoner and tell them that one of the others had
already talked. Victor was not fooled by this tactic and says that he kept silent.
At this time Victor says that the government's policy was to interrogate then
shoot captured guerrillas. According to Victor, this policy was reversed 4 or 5
days before his capture., due to "UN. pressure." Victor remembers that the G2 officer kept a loaded pistol on the table during the interrogation in order to
intimidate him. Victor called it mental torture. The police used the technique
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of claiming that the others had betrayed him already. He was finally thrown
into a humid cell where he developed an ear infection.
72 hours later (May 31) he was taken to the prison called El Castillo de
San Severino. This was a former "palace" located in Matanzas near the sea. It
had been built by the Spaniards for security purposes. San Severino had
underground detention cells with dirt floors and Victor was jailed there. He
was given newspaper to use as a carpet. There were insects in the cell and
Victor had an ear infection. On September 8 (Virgin's Day) a hearing was
held, and Victor was sentenced to 15 years in prison. Three days after his trial
Victor says that capital punishment was again reinstated for captured
guerrillas.
The first day with G-2 for Jose started out simple enough. They did not
hit him, they only asked him questions over and over: who was aiding the
rebels, where were their base camps, where did they store their arms, what
were their connections with other groups. The important thing was to deny
any involvement with Florida or the CIA as people directly implicated with
foreign powers were subject to death by firing squad. Josd says that he kept
silent and refused to say anything. When I asked him why didn't he just lie
and give them false information, he told me that is not the way he does
things. The day finished with no change in technique of interrogation.
The second day was different.
"We know that you were in Pinar del Rio. We know that you are
responsible for sabotage."
"You can’t prove it."
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They set in on him and began beating Josd with sticks, machetes, fists and
kicks. He says he was almost was kicked to death, but he wasn't going to take
it passively and got in a few good punches in return before he went down.
Now they started hitting Jose every time that he refused to answer. They
were very interested in who the group's contacts were in Miami, and the real
identities of the other column members. Jose didn’t have to lie in regards to
that question; he really did not know most of their true names. Jose says he
could tell that they were not professionally trained interrogators because they
relied on brutality as their method for eliciting cooperation. Jos£ says that this
is not a good technique and they could have extracted more information from
the prisoners if they had acted more professionally. He says that he still
remained silent in response to all their questions. Needless to say, he got hit.
On the third day they finally got tired of Jos6 and threw him into a room
that was kept at very low temperature. I have read that potentially useful
tactical information can be rendered useless by the detainee if he can keep
quiet long enough (a minimum of 24 hours) so that his section can clean up
their traces and vanish. Apparently, after 3 days the authorities came to the
conclusion that they would get no tactically relevant information, in any case,
the interrogations stopped.
Bernardo appeared the next day. He still had bandages and an
intravenous tube in him as he was recovering from the effects of 3 bullet
wounds. Bernardo stayed for 2 days and was then sent to La Cabana prison.
Jose would later hear from the guards that Bernardo had been immediately
on arrival at La Cabana, put in front of a firing squad and executed. The
intravenous tubes were still attached to Bernardo's body when they shot him.
This story would later be corroborated by other prisoners when Jose was
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transferred to La Cabana 6 months later. The historian Hugh Thomas says
that "the total number of executions by the revolution probably reached 2,000
by early 1961, perhaps 5,000 by 1970." (Vails, 1986:v).
Jos£ was kept in limbo at State Security for the next 6 months,
incommunicado and without being formally charged with any crime. The
State Security facility was known as "the waiting room of hell." Jose did not
know w hat the authorities would decide to do with him. Then one day he
was suddenly sent to La Cabana Prison in Havana. On arrival at La Cabana, he
waited 6 months before his court trial was convened. The prosecuting
attorney sought a 30 year sentence. Jose was convicted of terrorism and
conspiracy and was handed a 17 year prison term.
The time spent with State Security was a period when the individuals of
two separate corporate groups- G-2 and the counterrevolutionary suspectshad to make decisions that would affect the detainee's status and identity
indefinitely. G-2, not the Cuban judicial system, would make the decision if
the individual prisoners were guilty or not. A look at the evolution of their
status reads like this:

Etic Status

Self Definition

Government's View

Insurgent

Freedom Commando

Bandit, Terrorist

Detainee

Political prisoner

Terrorist
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A certain transformation had now occurred. Jose, Victor and Carlos were
no longer guerrillas, but had now assumed the identities of political
prisoners. This new status would be ceremonially formalized during their
trials, which I will now describe.

CHAPTER SEVEN
THE TRIAL
Carlos's first stay at La Cabana was short: G-2 discovered that the stories
he had given them were false, so he was hauled back to State Security for
another round of interrogations. Carlos says that when the G-2 decided that
they could not break him psychologically, they made the decision to break
him physically. They began a process of beatings, which included being struck
in the face, stomach and genitals, sometimes with brass knuckles. They also
screamed in his face. Eventually he was sent to Isle de Pinos prison, thrown
into solitary confinement and told that he would be shot. During a beating
there, he was struck on the back and it still affects his handwriting today.
After his second go round with G-2, Carlos was then taken back to La
Cabana for his trial. He was given a public defender for his trial, but says it
was a kangaroo court. Carlos knew that he could at best hope for a 30 year
sentence, but would probably get the death sentence. His family was present
for the trial. They could not intercede for him. If they said that Carlos was
innocent, they would be considered counter-revolutionaries. Carlos was
sentenced to 30 years in prison.
Jose's trial was conducted at La Cabana also. Five State Security guards,
not the regular La Cabana prison guards, took Jos£, loaded him in a truck with
three other prisoners and drove him to another portion of the prison. The
guards were armed with AK-47 rifles. State Security ran the proceedings. Jose
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detected friction between State Security and the prison security services; State
Security did not have confidence in the prison guards. Jose attributes this
friction to the reportedly incompetent performance by the prison guards
during the execution of William Morgan.
At the trial the prisoners sat in the first row, the five guards in row two,
and more guards in the third row. The charges were read against Jose; he
stood accused of "rebellion and illicit reunion." (conspiracy). He was not
allowed to say in his defense anything concerning the treatment meted out by
State Security or the prison guards. The military tribunal handed Jose a 17
year sentence.
Victor’s trial was also conducted by State Security. He was charged with
crimes that he did not commit. For instance, the judge read the charges, and
accused Victor of killing a sergeant during the firefight he was captured in.
W hen Victor denied it, the judge shouted at him "descardos!" (how dare you
deny it!). Victor says that he was not allowed to testify on his own behalf, but
would say out loud the words "no" whenever a false charge was leveled at
him. He says that maybe a sergeant could have been killed in the fight that led
to his capture, but there would be no way of determining who shot who. So
many of them had been shooting you could not tell what happened. The Jefe
de G-2 wanted the death penalty. Victor says he was accused of "20,000"
crimes: he was "contra la patria" (against the nation), and was called a
"bandito."
The guards tied Victor up again and the revolutionary tribunal went to
deliberate. They returned and handed Victor a 30 year sentence.
Twenty days later Victor went to get his sentence in writing. The same
lawyer who was appointed to represent him at the trial and a minister from
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the government had to sign the document along with Victor. The sentence
had been downgraded to 15 years. The minister said that "G-2 wanted the
death sentence, and the tribunal had given him 30 years, but the revolution
would show Victor mercy and reduce the sentence to 15 years. Look how
generous the revolution is to you."
The lawyer advised Victor to sign and not to appeal his case. Victor
believes that the lawyer was a good man with his (Victor’s) best interests in
mind. The lawyer had admitted to him "look, I can't help you, it has already
been decided." Victor knew that if he did not sign he could be faced with new
charges of rebellion and possibly receive the death sentence, so he signed. He
also did not file an appeal because he knew of one guy that had received a 20
year sentence, appealed, and had the charge upped to the death penalty. That
man was shot. Victor says he would have signed even if the sentence were 30
years.
After a few (5) years in prison Victor reports that a new law came into
being where they could again petition for reduced sentences or freedom.
Victor reports that people did petition, as there were many people in prison
for spurious charges. People who were basically innocent had 10 year
sentences dropped to five years and hence released on the spot. Victor
believes that this was the government's way of admitting some people had
been imprisoned by dubious evidence and false charges. Others dropped from
30 to 15 years. Some actually had their sentences increased from 15 to 20 years.
Victor knew well enough not to petition, as he had been "caught in the act" of
being a guerrilla. He did not want to press his luck.
The prisoners were now faced with the prospect of long prison terms.
The final decision that they would make affecting their self definition would

be whether or not to participate in the political rehabilitation program. I will
now turn to their prison experiences to illustrate the context in which these
decisions were made.

CHAPTER EIGHT
ISLA DE PINOS
Isla de Pinos prison, also known as "Model Prison" was built in the
1930's by Cuban strongman Gerardo Machado. It is located on the Isla de Pinos
(Island of Pines) off the south coast of Cuba. Aside from various
administrative buildings and a round two story dining hall, the prisons main
features were the four 7-story round, stone buildings called circulars. The four
circulars surrounded a 4-story stone guard tower. It was in these circulars that
the prisoners lived. There were 93 cells per floor. The circulars had been built
to house 930 inmates apiece, but at times held up to 1,300 (Valladares 1984:51).
It would be here that both Carlos and Victor would spend much of the early
1960's.
Isla de Pinos was one of the prisons where the early rehabilitation
program was set up for political prisoners.
After being sentenced for 30 years, Carlos and one other member of the
group of eight refused to join the political re-education program and became
plantados. The ones who accepted rehabilitation would receive conjugal
visits, classes in communism, and would receive more hum ane treatment.
After his 6 months with G-2, Carlos for his part was sent back to the Isla de
Pinos, which he calls "an old style Chinese communist torture system." Here,
Carlos says that at meals he would sometimes be served a bowl of soup with
animal genitalia in it. Some prisoners went crazy, some committed suicide.
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Isla de Pinos was different from anything Carlos had previously
encountered. Here they were administered intelligence tests, psychological
evaluations, interrogations and had their complete files reviewed. The prison
authorities separated the prisoners into four different mini- prisons,
depending on their assessment of who you really were. The four prison
compounds were circular 7-story stone buildings called "circulars". Each
circular housed roughly 1,000 prisoners. When combined with the two square
buildings that completed the prison, Isla de Pinos housed around 6,000
prisoners. In circular number 1 Carlos found himself with university
students, high ranking military officers, lawyers, and politicians. The people
in Circular #1 were all educated, intelligent members of society who had held
positions of leadership and responsibility. Another former prisoner recalls
that Circular #1 was jokingly referred to as "Generals and Doctors" (which
parodied the title of a popular novel) and that the inmates were called
"cebecillas" (hotheads, pinheads) by the prison authorities due to their
intellectual nature (Valladares, 1984:218). Circular #2 held low ranking
enlisted soldiers from Batista's army, guajiros, and some urban workers with
little formal education. Circular #3 held people who were implicated in the
clandestine groups and the guerrilla columns. Carlos says Circular #4 was
similar to #2.
Carlos believes that the prisoners were segregated in this manner in
order to make the government's rehabilitation/re-education program more
effective. He believes that the authorities had little confidence in being able to
genuinely re-educate the prisoners in group #1. The "ones” were put to work
in the fields, and in the rock quarry, performing heavy manual labor. Carlos
thinks that this was to give idealistic college students a taste of real labor, as

well as to punish class enemies. Carlos reports that prisoners were at times
shot, bayoneted, or beaten in the fields. It was only after several months of
work that they would be approached with the offer of more lenient treatment
if they would only renounce their opposition to the revolution and in fact,
put their support for the revolution into writing. They would then be
allowed to have family visits, conjugal visits, better food, and an end or
reduction of forced labor. They would receive better treatment from the
guards. (No more genitalia in their soup). They would have better
correspondence, be separated from the "rebel" prisoners, and promised that
they would have their sentences reduced and quickly be reintegrated into
society. Of the seven men captured with Carlos, six agreed to join the
rehabilitation program. Carlos and the other man refused.
From his friends in circular #2 Carlos had gotten the impression that the
re-education program had gone ahead with more carrot and less stick. Carlos
believes that the prison authorities thought that they would be more
successful proselytizing in this group. They believed that the people in group
two were less educated and more easily susceptible to propaganda. It is
difficult to gauge the relative success of the program in these two prisons, but
soon there were two distinct groups: rehabs and plantados. The rehabs were
moved to a separate square building and became known as "Squares." Carlos
defines plantados as "the rebellious ones." Carlos reports that plantados
formed in prison groups 2,3 and 4 as well. Carlos does not know the exact
numbers, but says at one time there were 6000 political prisoners, of which
half (3,000) were plantados.
Politically this was an expedient way to "divide and conquer" and to
further break down the prisoners into typologies not based solely on their
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background or education level, but on the degree of resistance or cooperation
that they showed.
Although Carlos reports that prison group #4 was organized and treated
like prison group #2. Other accounts (Valladares, 1984) indicate that circular 4
had a mixed composition of educational levels. It seems that the prison
authorities may have tried various groupings at different times, or simply
transferred prisoners to break up intricate escape attempts.
From what he knows of the rehabilitation program from others Carlos
says that the it entailed more classes in Cuban history from a Marxist
perspective and taught the benefits of the revolution. The classes were not
particularly theoretical and would not appeal to someone from prison group
#1. Carlos also believes that group one was separated from the rest because
they were leaders, and that the authorities wanted to keep them from
organizing the guajiros into any further resistance.
Carlos is less certain on how the rehab program was conducted with
group #3. They were kept separated from group one, possibly to separate those
with leadership and political connections from those skilled in certain
clandestine techniques.
A fifth square building held prison group #5, which was composed of
common criminals. These people were used by the prison authorities to
intim idate the political prisoners. Eventually the common criminals were
transferred and the building was used to hold the squares. A sixth building
was used as a punishment pavilion. The 2-story kitchen and dining facility
reportedly could feed 5,000 people at one time (Valladares,1984).
Carlos says that the purpose of the rehab program was to break political
morale and religious principles. He calls it "a psychological plan to desensitize

75

you. To train you in Marxist doctrine". Those who refused to participate in
the rehabilitation program were often beaten, some were bayoneted and some
were shot and killed. Periodic inspections were characterized by extreme
brutality on the part of the guards. They would order the prisoners out of the
building and as the prisoners were forced out by rifle and bayonet toting
guards, other guards would rain blows on them with chains and wooden
clubs.
Victor had arrived at Isla de Pinos in September of 1961 by boat and
incarcerated in circular 2. He had been stripped of his clothing and issued a
yellow prison uniform (an old Batista army uniform). He was assigned to 1st
floor, cell #52, and shared it with one other prisoner. He reports that every
day a group of them would be taken out for indoctrination. They were
promised better food, family visits and liberty, but only if they agreed to join
the rehabilitation program. The plan was called the "three steps to liberty."
Victor says the program was a hoax and only used for brainwashing people.
The rehabs would be sent to the square building, had to sing the international
and shout "viva Fidel Castro." Victor reports that the prison authorities
w ould try to turn the squares into informants and that their promises were
lies.
There were 216 prisoners on the 1st floor of circular 2 and one day the
authorities called them all out to formation. They were offered the
rehabilitation program again during this formation. Nobody volunteered and
so the entire group was marched off to the punishment building (square
building 6) and forced to perform heavy manual labor for the next six
months. Victor was put to work busting rocks in a nearby quarry. He had to
work 10-12 hours everyday. Victor became sick and stressful, and went bald
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during this period. The authorities believed that the prisoners would give in.
One day in the quarry Victor grew so weak that he could not walk. He was
taken back to the prison and offered the rehabilitation plan again. He refused
and was hit for this. He says that it was against his moral principles and
would rather die than be a communist. He also prayed that the United States
would help.
Victor also says that in response to the Bay of Pigs invasion the prison
administration wired dynamite around the prison compounds with the
intent of killing the prisoners en mass if the Americans invaded. Earlier
accounts (Valladares,1984) corroborate this. The dynamite had been dug into
the foundations of the circulars, placed in some of the ventilation shafts and
stored in the basements. The circular guard tower was packed with dynamite,
turning it into a four-story fragmentation grenade. Valledares reports that a
prisoner named Americanito had climbed through the plumbing shaft into
the basement and returned with sticks of dynamite and fuses. Americanito
told the rest of the prisoners that the dynamite seemed to be wired by cables so
that it could be electrically ignited from a distant point. Some imprisoned
American CIA agents who were familiar with explosives were given samples
of what Americanito found. The CIA agents, led by Daniel Caswell, called it a
"double fail-safe detonation system" that is, both electrical and mechanical.
Some of the imprisoned technicians in circular 4 set about trying to defuse
and deactivate as much of the dynamite as possible, others built homemade
grenades, and some of the less educated prisoners took to hanging a piece of
wood around their necks in the belief that if you bit down on wood during
the explosion, it would mitigate the effects of the blast. When it was too quiet
at night, some of the prisoners would grow terrified that the guards had been
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evacuated because the order for the TNT to be exploded had been given
(Valladares, 1984: 91-94).
When Victor arrived in September of 1961 the dynamite was still there,
it stayed until after the October 1962 missile crisis. In September of 1962, just
before the time of the October crisis, Victor says that some of the prisoners felt
there was nothing to live for and wanted to set off the dynamite prematurely
in order to kill as many guards and officials as possible. Others in their
despair, found a meaningful expiaination to the problem of the dynamite in
religion. One of Victor's fellow prisoners wrote the poem "Presidio Modelo
Dinam itado" (Dynamite Model Prison, Ruidiaz-Marichal, 1990:17) that in part
reads:
Hemos visto con accion
los trabajando,
el T.N.T. coloando
con cuidado y precausion.
De nosotros la explosion
ni uno solo dejara,
el comunismo podra
tal vez, realizer su anhelo
pero hay un Dios en el cielo
y de eso encargara.
Triste vida que sellada
junta con la muerte ronda
en una fuerte y redonda
circular dinamitada.
a volar en pedacitos!
Fidel pregontado a gritos
que desapareceremos,
pero al morir llevaremos
mas moral que Moralitos.
We have a plan of action
the technicians are working
putting the TNT away
with care and precaution.
For us the explosion
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not one person will say
that communism will be able to perhaps realize its dreams
but there is a God in the sky
and in Him we have faith.
Sad life that we finish
together in the circle of death
in a strong and round circle of dynamite.
Oh mother of destiny
return us in pieces
Fidel is shouting that we will disappear
but we will go to our deaths
more moral than the Moralitos.
The prisoners were frustrated and finally began a hunger strike, it got out
of control and turned into a riot. The prisoners had contraband matches and
went crazy, people began hauling their mattresses out of the cells, setting
them on fire, and throwing them over the ledges. Burning mattresses were
falling from all stories and piling up on the first floor. The prison guards ran
away and the prisoners were laughing, Victor says that it was the only time
they were ever able to get even with the guards. Victor says that the prisoners
didn't really believe that the burning mattresses would be close enough to the
dynamite to ignite it, but the guards believed that the prisoners had gone
insane and were going to kill everyone in a mass suicide-homicide.
Armored vehicles and tanks surrounded the prison the next day. At 6
a.m. the prison director himself appeared and asked the prisoners through
the Major if they would come out of the circular quietly for a peaceful
inspection. "You can see what's surrounding you, come down and leave it in
God’s hands." They agreed and everyone (over 1,000 men) was evacuated
from circular 2. This event came to be known as "La Pacifica." On the first day,
circulars 2 and 4 were stripped bare, on the second day the guards cleared out
circulars 1 and 3. The guards entered and removed everything flammable or

not nailed down - mattresses, sheets, blankets, books- everything. It went on
till 6 p.m. and Victor estimates 300 soldiers took part. The prisoners were
stripped naked, many were beaten, and spent 15 days without clothes while
the authorities decided what to do. The solution was to clear all prisoners out
of the first floor so that nobody could get anywhere near the dynamite. The
first floor of all the circulars were stripped of their bunks and only guards
were allowed to loiter there. After the October missile crisis the dynamite was
removed and the prisoners were told to write to their families and to ask
them to send them new clothes.
Inspections were as violent as those at La Cabana. Violence was used
both to back up prison regulations and as an arbitrary way of dealing with
prisoners. At La Cabana Jos6 had been beaten so badly that he once was
unconscious for two days. Carlos was beaten at Isla de Pinos and suffered
nerve damage. All the prisoners cite seeing people bayoneted or hit by the
guards and report that many prisoners died from this treatment.
Organized forced labor groups were formed in 1964 for those prisoners
who refused to participate in rehabilitation. Some worked in the quarries
near the prison, others cut sugar-cane. Both Carlos and Victor were members
of these work groups.
Carlos says that the U.N. has some microfilm smuggled out from the
prison. Che Guevera went to address the UN. and the films were shown, and
Che said that "We shoot people and will continue to." Carlos says that when
the Red Cross asked to visit the prison, Castro said only if they came in
combat.
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Carlos spent 8 months at Isla de Pinos, Victor three years. Several
hum an rights groups looked into it and the camp was closed down. The
inmates were transfered to various prisons.
Carlos and Victor were now no longer simply political prisoners, but had
assumed the identity of the plantado. As a right of passage in the evolving
self-image of these men, this transformation to plantado_status is the concept
by which they would henceforth identify themselves.

CHAPTER NINE
LA CABANA
La Cabana fortress was built by the Spaniards during colonial times to
protect Havana from English pirates. Built on high ground overlooking the
city, it is strategically placed so that its guns can cover both the harbor and the
Presidential Palace. Batista's artillery school had formerly occupied the
fortress. Due to the extreme number of political prisoners incarcerated since
the revolution, La Cabana had been transformed into a large prison by the
new Marxist state. A special vehicle known as "the bitch" which was a poorly
ventilated armored truck, would transport the prisoners across the
drawbridge that spanned the moat to the fortress. There are some old
buildings immediately inside the fortress, just past the iron gates behind the
drawbridge, that serve as a processing station.
On his arrival at La Cabana, Jose arrived during the night with four
other prisoners. The guards took one look at him and one shouted "how can
a Negro be a counter-revolutionary?"
The guards rounded on Jos£ and began punching him and prodding him
with bayonets. He was herded directly to a punishment cell that was separate
from the other general prison facilities. This cell for the most part was solitary
confinement cell, although on occasion 2-3 other prisoners were tossed in
with him. Other than that, Jos6 says that the rats were his only friends during
this time, and he was kept there for the next two months.
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On release from solitary, Jose was allowed to shower and then issued a
prison uniform. The prison garb was the old khaki-yellow uniform from the
Army of Cuba (Batista’s army). Jos6 was placed in a large rectangular galley
which contained about 400 prisoners. A grill blocked off both the entrances to
the galley and a large pit lay outside of the back. The galleys were 3 stories
high, and to the front of each was a central courtyard. They were basically long
mailbox shaped tunnels barred off at both entrances. The walls were
estimated to be 3 feet thick. Two machine-gun nests called garitas were built
into the outer wall which closed off the prison. Four .30 caliber machine guns,
one at each corner of the fortress wall, covered the prison compound. Ten
armed guards manned the outer wall. There were eleven partially
underground galleys, numbered 7-17, as well as a number of others, including
a special one known as galera 22 which at times held those who were
common criminals, at other times ex military personnel condemned to death.
Small punishm ent cells called capillas (little chapels) were located behind
galley 22. All were facing a walled off patio. The galleys are 120 feet long with
50 beds apiece, with the exception of galley 14, which had 17 beds. The galleys
had domed ceilings, with rooms approximately 20 meters long and less than 8
meters wide. There were 2 toilets near the entrance and a small shower and
sink in a separate cubicle. Bunk beds stacked either 3 or 4 high filled the
rooms, which had central passageways of less than 2 meters wide. One former
prisoner, John Martino, estimates that at one time there were about 1,500
prisoners in La Cabana and only 675 beds (Martino 1963).
When morning broke on Jose's first day in the general prison, he was
still somewhat frightened. The day started out ordinarily enough. The
prisoners were lined up for roll call at 5 a.m. and then at 6 a.m. a breakfast
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line formed up for bread, water and sugar. Typical prison routines. Then all of
a sudden the guards burst into the compounds with fixed bayonets, swinging
rifle butts into prisoners faces. Josd did not know what was happening.
This was the first of many "requistas" or surprise inspections. Another
former prisoner, Armando Valladares (1984) describes the inspection process:
For the inspections the platoon of soldiers armed with wooden
truncheons, chains and bayonets, and anything else they could beat us with,
would erupt into the galleras shouting and striking out blindly. The order
was that we prisoners were to come out of the cells the instant the cell doors
were opened. But when the cell doors would be opened the angry mob of
soldiers would rush in like a whirlwind, meting out blows at random.
Prisoners, also like a whirlwind would be trying to get out into the prison
yard, and so a knot of prisoners and guards beating them would form at the
door, since we all couldn't fit through at the same time. We were always in
mortal terror of those inspections. We would be gripped by panic, desperation
and worst of all confusion- we would try to escape unharmed, but that was
virtually impossible since outside the patio a double file of guards armed with
rifles and fixed bayonets made sure that no one failed to receive his quota of
blows and kicks." (Valladares, 1984:21-22).
Aside from intimidation, the inspections were geared towards
uncovering contraband items, as at one time even a contraband radio was in
the prison. Josd says that major inspections would always occur a day or two
before the 26th of July, as it was an important political day for the
government and they did not want any prison disruptions.
Carlos coroberates both Josh's and Armando Valledares accounts of the
beatings. "Soldiers would get in a line and hit you. A lot of people got broken
legs and backs." Jose's current roomate Eduicio, who spent 6 years (1964-1970)
as a political prisoner, says simply, "Golpe. golpe. golpe." Eduicio also concurs
with the others in regards to the violence.
The prisoners were beaten quite forcefully that day and then herded out
into the courtyard. After much confusion and harassment, Josd returned back
to his galley in time for lunch. The dining hall was in a separate building and
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the prisoners would file through, one galley eating quickly before they were
ordered to leave and the next galley sent through. Lunch was usually a sort of
vegetable stew with peas, often infested with grubs and cockroaches. If you
had relatives who knew where you were being held, they would sometimes
bring gofio (roasted flour), caramel candies and powdered milk to supplement
your diet. Water was strictly rationed and amounted to 4 cups per prisoner
per day. This made proper hygiene problematic.
Jose referred me to a book (Vails,1986) that he believes is an accurate
description of the routine at La Cabana, and the next three paragraphs are
based on this source.
After lunch, the prisoners were allowed to mingle in the open courtyard
and get some fresh air, or visit friends in other galleys. Waiting in line to use
the toilet was one of the more frequently recurring daily frustrations. As
diarrhea was a constant problem, people would sometimes defecate in sinks,
showers, buckets or other assorted locations. Depending on how many
prisoners were being held at the time there might not be enough beds. Jose
arrived at a time of sufficient bedding, he slept on the first level of bunks as it
was customary among the prisoners not to require those arriving from
solitary confinement the hassle of having to climb up and down three levels
worth of bunk beds. At other times the prisoners tried to clean the floor with
whatever water that they could obtain late in the day or evening, so that
prisoners like who slept on the floor might find it partially clean
(Vails,1986:23-24).
Each prisoner was given a plastic water bottle or a pail and sometimes
prisoners pooled their water to take baths. Bunks were moved and a small
bathing area set up, which the prisoners waited patiently in line to use.
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During the rainy season the galleys would flood and sometimes the toilets
and sinks would overflow, sending feces and dirty water everywhere (Vails
1986:22).
Dinner was served at 4 p.m. (More pea stew). The prisoners were allowed
to socialize until 9 p.m. and then were returned to their galleys. Lights out
would come at 10 p.m. after a final roll call. A large spotlight would beam
through the back grill at night, and an armed guard would keep watch. The
prisoners would have to inform the guard through the galley chief if they
needed to use the toilet in the night; otherwise the guard was liable to shoot
at anyone making unauthorized movements. Those sleeping under the beds
and on the floors would often encounter rats making their nocturnal rounds
(Vails 1986:22).
It was in the evenings and throughout the nights that the executions
would take place in the trench that surrounded the rear entrance to the
galleys. It was here that Bernardo was killed. Jose says that in some galleys you
could not watch the executions in person, only hear the shootings. Other
galleys had a more direct view. Those condemned to die were kept in a small
holding area near galley 22 where the common criminals could ridicule them
by shouting "Viva Castro!" Often the prisoners being executed would shout
"Viva Cristo Rey" just before their deaths. A fence kept the common
criminals from mingling with the political prisoners under normal
circumstances, but those being led to execution would have to pass by them
and they would be spat on and have trash thrown at them. Some of the
prisoners tried to protest but their complaints were ignored.
One of the internal problems among the prisoners that Jose pointed out
was that many common criminals would be labeled as counter
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revolutionaries by the authorities for crimes such as stealing, rape etc. and
thrown in with the true and committed members of the organization.
Professional soldiers like Jos<§ could generally detect if their fellow prisoners
possessed the skills and experience of a true freedom commando and again
like in the mountains of Pinar del Rio, categorize the true from the false.
Jos6 reports that the prisoners developed their own set of rules. He lists
the following in this order.
(1) Respect for military men, regardless of what army they had
previously served in (Batista's Army of Cuba; Castro's 26 of July rebel army,)
(2) To clean the floors three times a week (to avoid lice)
(3) To study (languages, the Bible)
(4) Everyone is serving one cause
Victor lists the implicit prison rules as (1) respect, (2) unity, (3) ideology
and (4) equality and friendship. Victor, Vincente and Javier all say that there
were no thieves or spies among the political prisoners.
Psychological and spiritual strength were derived in various forms from
writing poetry and stories, conversations between inmates, and for Jose
especially, reading the bible.
Jose and his friends would find paragraphs in the bible that dealt with
Christ's sufferings and draw parallels with their own lives. Saturday and
Sunday afternoons were special because the prisoners would be left
unmolested for two hours to hold religious observances in the hallways. Jose
says that since some of the guards were religious, they would respect their
quiet time for worship. The prisoners would sit around the hallway and
present to one another inspirational readings in this manner. I asked Jos6 if
he had a particularly favorite section from the bible during this time. He
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replied yes, Apocalypse was his favorite section, as it hinted as to what was in
store for the communists in the end. Jose gave me a book by one of his fellow
prisoners to help explain these ideas, the prisoner, a man named Pardo, had
written a poem that in part reads:
El Kremlin se propaga debajo del talon
Y avanza agazapado
Armado de escarnio, el odio y la traicion.
Las manos encrispadas,
Diabolicas de Lenin, parecen dos guadanas,
-Satan esta de fiesta!La tetrica y mecabra
Doctrina communista, plagada de rapina
-No es mas que la Paz-SiegaQue oculta el idea del pueblo soerano.
Despiertan las Naciones
No toman del brebaje malefico e inhumano
Cercenen el avance
Del monstruo uniformado con mascara de oveja.
No crean en desarme..
Las hienas quiren sangre e inundan los lugares
A ndando enmascaradas
Preparense los pueblos de libres continentes
Venced el infortunio
Marxista-Leninista que hace cual serpientes
Emponzonar las tierras
Bailando la vil danza con de esclavitud.
Antorcha libertadora...
Enciende la maleza...sembrando la virtud...
The Kremlin spreads beneath the curtain
and advances armed with utter taunting words
The hatred and the treason
Lenin's diabolically convulsive and twitching hands
they resemble two scythes
Satan is in celebration!...
...the gloomy macabre
communist doctrine, plagued with looting
It is nothing more than blind peace!
it conceals the ideal of the sovereign nation
Nations wake up!
Do not drink of the evil and inhumane concoction.
Curtail the progress of the uniformed monster
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in sheep's clothing!
They do not believe in disarmament... the hyenas want blood
and they flood the places
roaming in disguise ...
prepare yourselves nations of the free continents
conquer the misfortunate Marxist-Leninists
that as serpents poison the land
Dancing their dastardly dance
with the tune of slavery
The liberating torch set the thicket afire...
Sewing virtue...
Josd also enjoyed the stories about Paul because "he was such a good
friend to Jesus." However eventually his bible was taken away from him.
La Cabana and Isle de Pinos are but two of the prisons inhabited by
plantados; Boniato, Kilo Siete, El Principe and Guanajay were some of the
other prom inent prisons. All separated plantados from the rehabs and
common criminals, all were marked by requistas and rehabilitation programs.
Two of my informants, Roman and Javier, joined the rehabilitation program,
they report that they were treated well and feel that being in the program was
instrumental in securing them earlier release dates. They say that they were
not hit, but that the plantados were treated worse.

CHAPTER TEN
THE REHABILITATION PROGRAM
Amnesty International has been concerned for many years about reports
of ill treatment of (Cuban) political prisoners... Many of the most serious
allegations have been related to the prisoners who have come to be known as
"plantados." Amnesty International has received many reports over the years
that, in response to their refusal to cooperate with the prison regime, they
were deprived for long periods of many rights. Many spent years without
visits and correspondence or access to sunlight and exercise. Medical
treatment was reportedly withheld or insufficient and food and sanitary
conditions inadequate. Several, particularly in the early years, died in
detention, in some cases apparently as a result of inadequate medical
attention, others while on hunger strike, and yet others apparently as a result
of beatings and severe prison conditions. The organization has consistently
expressed concern to Cuban authorities regarding their conditions of
detention...
The in ter-American Commission of Hum an Rights (of the OAS) has
published two reports on the situation of political prisoners and their families
in Cuba: the information has been gathered from allegations made by Cuban
prisoners and their families. In these reports there is a wealth of allegations of
physical and psychological torture, executions and simulated executions of
prisoners, and inhumane prison conditions. Most of these allegations are
gathered from the early 1960's...Prisoners have alleged that when they refused
to accept the ideological rehabilitation courses imposed by the Cuban
government, they were subjected to numerous tortures.
As the Cuban government has consistently refused to accept an
international commission of inquiry, it has been impossible to check these
allegations...(Amnesty International, 1988).
The refusal to participate in the political rehabilitation program was the
defining event of the plantados prison experience. The program was called
"the three steps to liberty" and was offered in both Isla de Pinos and La Cabana
during the early 1960's. The three steps involved prison, rehabilitation camps,
89
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and parole. Victor says that the plan was designed with the objective of
causing dissension among the prisoners and dividing them. Carlos said it was
a "psychological plan to desensitize you. To train you in Marxist doctrine."
Jose thought that the plan might originally been proposed by some rich
prisoners in La Cabana as a means of reducing their sentences.
In La Cabana, a small school was set up called "Escuilita" where the
prisoners undergoing rehabilitation underwent political studies. Animosity
arose between the rehabilitation prisoners and those who refused to
participate; the latter came to be known as "plantados" (diehards). One day
after the escuelita let out some of the plantados began throwing orange peels
and trash at the rehabilitation prisoners, a brawl developed and from then on
the two groups were kept separated. The authorities simply labeled the
plantados "Rebel Prisoners" and cordoned off sections of the prison so the
two groups could not mingle. The prisoners in rehabilitation at Isla de Pinos
were moved out of the circulars into the square buildings (thus gaining the
nickname "squares"). They performed a play in the dining hall one day called
"The three steps to liberty" which the plantados felt was mocking and
derisive. If the objective of rehabilitation was to divide and weaken the
opposition early results seemed to indicate that it was working for the
governm ent.
Victor did not join rehabilitation because he said that he w ould not let
the jailers divide him from his comrades, and that he had moral principles
that he could not violate. He did not want to betray Martin Campos,
democracy and the struggle. He says hat he knew that he would receive a
sentence reduction if he participated, but that he refused all the same.
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"The plan had no meaning for those with beliefs. I was born in a
democratic system, I was raised in a democracy and I will die for democracy"
says Victor.
Victor's elastic definition of democracy, which seems to include the
Batista regime, can be defined as an experience near concept.
Jos6 says that he did not participate in rehabilitation because he "didn't
want to." Jose says that it would mean surrender and that you would have to
submit to their rules. He says that to join rehabilitation would be almost
"sacrilegious." He refused, primarily, because of those people like Bernardo
who had been executed or died in the war: Jose could not betray them or their
ideals. To join the program would be like "rejecting everything." At La
Cabana, those who refused rehabilitation were subjected to a continuation of
the requista system or sent to San Severino, another prison with a notorious
hum an rights record. Jose cites the fact that rehabilitated prisoners were sent
to agricultural work camps: he did not want to provide the communists with
free labor. The authorities made repeated overtures to Jose and his friends to
join rehabilitation, but they could not sway him. Having made the choice to
remain a plantado. he would wind up paying a heavy price for his
recalcitrance. Jose was eventually shipped to San Severino prison, where on
arrival, a prison officer named LT. Ramirez (derisively called "Chancletica" by
the prisoners) took one look at Josd and shouted "how can a Negro be a
counter-revolutionary?" and plunged a bayonet through Jose's shoulder.
Writhing in pain, Jose was sent to the prison doctor, who treated his wound.
The bayonet had pierced Jose straight through the tattoo of Christ's Holy
Grail. The symbolism of this wound wasn't lost on Jose.
Several months later, during a requista, the guards beat Jose so badly that
he lapsed into a coma for three days. He awoke on the third day back at La

92

Cabana, where he was sent to because of its superior medical facilities. Jos£
convalesced there for the next six months.
Vincente, another plantado, says that rehabilitation was for the
"gullible" and he did not accept it because he was not fooled.
Carlos believes that to join the program would have meant to betray all
his ideals and like Jose and Victor, also refused. For this, both he and Victor
were put into forced labor groups working in quarries and agricultural labor
around the Isla de Pinos.
The forced labor began for plantados at Isla de Pinos began in August of
1964 and was known as the "Plan Camillo Cienfuegos." Both Victor and
Carlos say that the authorities made them do heavy manual labor until the
prisoner would break and ask for rehabilitation. Of the 216 prisoners in
Victor's forced labor group, only 83 held out from requesting rehabilitation
after 9 months worth of ill treatment.
Although they all agreed rehabilitation was a moral quandary, they soon
saw how the program could be manipulated. Not all their friends who had
joined rehabilitation were betraying them. Victor says that they were still
"brothers." When the plantados would go on hunger strikes, some of the
rehabilitated prisoners even joined them. The rehabilitated prisoners, with
access to better mail and medicine, soon began smuggling food, candy,
cigarettes, water, medicine and mail to the plantados. They provided a link to
the outside world, and became effective allies in the struggle to ameliorate
living conditions, and to let the UN and other hum an rights organizations
know of the plantados situation. Victor had some good friends in the plan
and did not hate them.
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Victor cites this example of both guards and "squares " helping the
plantados. A collaborator had been designated as "chief of the prisoners", that
is, he was appointed by the authorities to be a overseer of his fellow prisoners.
Victor says that the man, known as "Commander Prado" was worse than the
guards. Prado had sent a number of prisoners into a punishm ent cell called
"El H ucio."
It was cramped and poorly ventilated and the prisoners were protesting.
Prado decided to let some of the less rebellious prisoners out, when Victor
and 8 others began chanting "all or none!" Prado yanked the 8 aside and told
the guards "these are your strikers. The CIA has infiltrated the prison." A
guard named Monjo who didn't like Prado ordered all the prisoners released
from the punishm ent cell. Monjo told Prado, who lived with the
rehabilitated prisoners, that he was going to send him to live with the
plantados. Prado became frightened for his life, and broke down crying.
Finally Prado was allowed back to the "squares" building, where some
rehabilitated prisoners beat him up so badly that he was put into the hospital.
Jose said that he could not judge the rehabilitated prisoners because he
did not know each man's personal circumstances. Victor says that the plan
appealed to people with long sentences who had no other hope. Victor, Jose
and Carlos all report that certain guards were helping them also. They report
that some of the prison guards, on receiving orders to escort the prisoner back
to his cell and beat him, would forgo the beatings. After a while they could
distinguish the humane and sympathetic guards from the sadistic ones. Some
of the sympathetic guards went on to participate in smuggling for, and
helping, the plantados.
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I interviewed three ex-prisoners who participated in rehabilitation. Javi
had been imprisoned in 1965 after he had been caught in downtown Havana
loitering with a Czech submachine gun concealed under his coat. He had been
sentenced to 20 years in prison. He joined rehabilitation to get out early, and
did so after 10 years. He says that he was treated well in rehabilitation, but that
the plantados were treated worse. He did not believe in Communism and left
for the states when the first opportunity (Mariel Boat lift, 1980) presented
itself. I asked him what he thought of the plantados. "The truth?" Javi said,
glancing at Victor and Vincente, (both plantados) and then looking me right
in the eye. "I thought they were stupid. Why serve 20 years when you only
have to do 10." Victor and Vincente said nothing.
Ramon was also a participant in rehabilitation during the 1960s. He too
reports a reduction of his sentence, better treatment, saw the plantados ill
treated, and says that he did not believe in communism. He to emigrated to
the United States at the first available opportunity.
Waldo was in rehabilitation during the 1980's. He says that he did not
become a plantado because he knew that he could not take the ill treatment.
He played the game but did not believe in the political indoctrination either,
and left for the states when the opportunity (Mariel) presented itself.
It is unclear why the prison authorities would want people in
rehabilitation if they were dyed in the wool recalcitrants. By Castro's own
admission there were 20,000 political prisoners being held in Cuban jails
during the year 1965 (Lockwood,1969:247). This was not only an economic
drain, but a political liability as well, since many of the prisoners were
imprisoned for minor or dubious reasons (ibid, 247-48). Castro told Lockwood
that the aim of rehabilitation was to "neutralize" the prisoner politically, so
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that he would offer no further resistance upon release. To convince them that
they fought against the revolution out of ignorance (ibid:250). One official
said of the program:
We do not try to indoctrinate them. Most of the internees have such a
low level of political understanding when they come to us that they would
not understand it if we did."(ibid:250).
"All we thought about was politics" says Victor.
Lockwood got a hold of one of the textbooks used in the political studies
program course in rehabilitation program. He cites the following examples of
the text:
"Bourgeois sociologists and politicians declare as accidental and
unnatural an event so in accordance with the laws and necessary from the
historical point of view as the great October Socialist Revolution, only
because that revolution and that socialist state system contradict the interests
of the bourgeoisie."
"Humanity has traversed a long and complex road, stretching from the
primitive community, through slavery, feudalism, and capitalism to the
socialism of today, formed in the powerful Socialist camp...
"In order to carry out the great, historic fight which our country is
leading in Latin America, it is necessary to understand the real causes and
motivating forces of historical events and the laws of development...
"Historical materialism was born in the decade of the 1840's, created by
Marx and Engels, great sages and thinkers, teachers and guides of the working
class. The appearance of historical and dialectical materialism represented the
most magnificent practical revolution in science...(ibid:250-251).
The math lessons from the rehabilitation text also had political
overtones:
In the semi-colonial colonies of Latin America about 4 people die of
hunger, curable disease, or premature old age every minute. How many
people die in Latin America every 3 minutes under the social system of
exploitation which imperialism has established?
Let us multiply 3x4 = 12.
Answer: The result of multiplying the number of people who die every
minute by 3 minutes gives us the number of Latin Americans who die in our
continent every 3 minutes and would not die under a just social system.
(ibid:251-252).
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Valladares echoes Victor's and Carlos's analysis of political rehabilitation
as division and psychological warfare, he says that the program had one
strategy: "to snare leaders... to keep out men they thought unimportant, and
psychologically break down the rest." (Valladares, 1984:219). Lee Lockwood, an
American journalist who visited prisoners going through reeducation on Isle
de Pinos in 1965 reported that no pressure is brought on a prisoner to join.
(Lockwood,1969:249). Victor laughed when I mentioned this to him.

CHAPTER ELEVEN
CONCLUSIONS
For Victor, Carlos and Jos6, to accept rehabilitation would be tantamount
to surrender, and betrayal of all their beliefs. It would be like accepting a social
order incongruent with the moral order of existence. Victor served out his
full 15 year sentence at prisons such as Isla de Pinos and San Severino, and
finally, Avica prison. He was released on May 28, 1976. While out processing,
a guard asked him "why didn't you accept rehabilitation? You could have
been out in 5-7 years." Victor replied that as he respected the guard's beliefs,
he expected the guard to respect his. He did not believe in rehabilitation and
his ideology was to have mutual respect. The guard should understand and
accept this.
Victor lived quietly with some relatives in Cuba before emigrating to the
US. during the 1980's. Today he lives on a small pension in a tiny apartment
in the heavily Latino neighborhood behind Vegas World known as "the
naked city." He is friends with other ex-prisoners, particularly Vincente and
Ram on.
Carlos was released in 1989 and emigrated to the US after a series of
agreements between the US and Cuban governments allowed for this to
happen with former political prisoners. After a brief marriage, and divorce,
he became a kitchen helper at a local casino.
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After La Cabana, (1965-1968) Jos£ served time in Prison "5.5" (19681973),San Severino (1973-1974) and Nuevo Morajon (1974-1977). He was
released in 1977. None of his prison experiences "neutralized" him. After 6
months of living quietly with his wife in Havana, under the watchful eyes of
the local CDR, Jose got involved with a small circle of people who were
organizing against the government. Jos6 had found work as an electrician (He
had learned the trade while in school before joining the army after his
father's death). During the 1982 Pan Am Games in Havana, Jose was working
as one of the maintenance men in Lenin Park hotel, where all the athletes
were staying. Jose was in the generator room and switched all the currents
from 110 to 220. This shorted out the electrical system and destroyed several
motors. Meat and perishable foods in the hotels refrigerators and freezers
quickly spoiled, and all the lights and electricity went down. Jos£ was accused
of sabotage but denied it. He told the investigators that if he had of set the
currents to 220 the whole place would have burned down. Since Jose and his
friend Rubio were the only ones working in proximity to the power room
that day, it was obvious to the investigators that they had to be responsible,
but there was just enough doubt that they did not get into legal trouble.
Nevertheless, they were booted out of Lenin Complex and not allowed to
return.
Josh's group was infiltrated shortly after that and the members
imprisoned. Jos£ served a second prison term from 1982 to 1989 during which
he maintained his defiant attitude and behavior. One example of his
continued defiance during his second prison term that is illustrative of Josh's
continued uncompromising behavior occurred during the US invasion of
Grenada. News reached the prisoners that the commander of the Cuban

contingent to Grenada, a man named Tortolo, had become an object of
national ridicule after several of his subordinates reported on a television
interview that Tortolo had panicked and fled his post at the onset of the US
invasion. Jose and a friend had made a huge poster out of cardboard that
showed a tennis shoe and read "si usted quire correr rapido y veloz usa tenis
Tortolo" (if you want to run fast, use Tortolo tennis shoes). The authorities
called the prisoners to formation and asked who was guilty of drawing and
posting the derisive cartoon. In order to keep all the prisoners from getting in
trouble, Jose and his friend stepped forward. They were taken to see an official
named Boyes.
"Oh, so you are the two artists who drew Comrade Tortolo" Boyes said
laughing.
"We were just doing a drawing of Comrade Tortolo."
Boyes may have been amused, but still sentenced them to six months in
solitary confinement, during which Jose states that he was fed only once a
day.
Jose contends that the government's reaction to dissent continued to be
arbitrary and unjust during the 1980's. One of Jose's favorite stories which he
backs up the claim with is about a fellow prisoner, an old man named
Juancito. Juancito was 65 years old and before his imprisonment, he had a
dream one night that Raul and Fidel Castro had died and Cuba had become a
western style democracy. Juancito told his wife about the dream and told her
not to repeat it to anybody. At the market that day she was gossiping with
friends and other vendors and told them about her husband's dream. The
lower classes in Cuba are very superstitious about dreams and soon the story
had spread throughout the area. The police got wind of the rum or going
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around that "Castro is going to die, Juancito saw it in his dreams." The old
lady also repeated the story to the Local CDR leader. Jose says that Juancito
received a five year prison sentence for "conspiracy and terrorism "-for having
a dream.
Jose also claims that he knew another guy who was imprisoned for
criticizing the milk producing capabilities of Castro's favorite cow,
Matilda.
In 1989 Jose was released from prison and sent to the United States after
the US and Cuba came to an agreement on the release of political prisoners.
Today he is a dishwasher in a popular Las Vegas Casino. Jose also has a
daughter and some nieces that live in Las Vegas.
In the summer of 1992, Jose was living in Las Vegas with his social
worker (a Cuban woman who grew up in the same neighborhood as Jose) and
another former prisoner named Leo. During a domestic dispute, Leo shot Jose
twice w ith a small caliber pistol, hitting him once in the torso and again in
the wrist. Jos6 fell to the ground in pain, and began to call out to Lazaro to
save him from dying. Lazaro answered Jose's prayers.
Today, Jose still has a bullet lodged in his body. For protection, Jos6 has
behind his front door a small shrine. There is a statue of a rooster, and in
front of the rooster, a glass of water. In front of the this is a plate with a
coconut on it, surrounded by some candies. A figurine of a small bird in front
of a second glass of water sits across from the rooster, as if they are having
lunch together. A candle is lit next to them every evening. This is for
protection. "If the rooster crows three times, it means that you will be
betrayed" says Jos£.

101

The strange opacity of certain empirical events, the dumb senselessness
of intense or inexorable pain, and the enigmatic unaccountability of gross
iniquity all raise the uncomfortable suspicion that perhaps the world, and
hence m an's life in the world, has no genuine order at all-no empirical
regularity, no emotional form, no moral coherence. And the religious
response to this suspicion is in each case the same: the formulation, by means
of symbols, of an image of such a genuine order of the world which will
account for, and even celebrate, the perceived ambiguities, puzzles and
paradoxes in hum an experience. The effort is not to deny the undeniable- that
there are unexplained events, that life hurts or that rain falls upon the justbut to deny that they are inexplicable, that life is unendurable and that justice
is a mirage. (Geertz,1973).
From accounts of African and Haitian Voodoo priests to stories about
Castro's cow, various apocryphal religious beliefs of the prisoners served to
stress the illegitimacy of the Castro regime and suggest a meaningful counter
order to the system. And much like Evans-Pritchard's (1937) description of
the Azande belief system, the prisoners behavior is logical and conduct is
rational if one accepts the basic assumptions they believed in: that
communism was intrinsically evil and in the end justice would prevail. Jose
knew from reading the Bible that the communists would receive
supernatural punishm ent come judgment day. It was the duty of every
Christian and Democratic Freedom Commando to fight them to the death.
Material considerations were an insignificant triviality when compared to the
cosmic scope of the battle being waged.
Religious beliefs involve not a Baconian induction from everyday
experience-for then we should all be agnostics- but rather a prior acceptance of
authority which transforms that experience. (Geertz, 1973).
I further argue that this a prior acceptance of religion that Geertz alludes
to invokes the idea of primary groups as the source of these beliefs. The
padrino, Carlos's father, and Diego's parents all helped socialize these deep
rooted beliefs into our informants. These religious beliefs and the idea that
communism would destroy religion took on a new urgency with the
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realization of Castro's victory. A long feared pariah group, the communists
had seized power and our informants worst fears were materializing. They
saw no recourse but to fight, regardless of the odds. By the time Jose was
captured his relationships with members of the guerrilla force were as
powerful as family ties. For both Victor and Jose, intense primary group tieswith people such as Martin Campos, and Bernardo Corraies, and other
soldiers of the Commando, helped cement these loyalties.
In regards to beliefs, religion, communism and ideas on the relative
merits of parliamentary democracy vs. those of a Soviet style state were
important. Religious and political enculturation from their parents and
childhood was augmented by either their exposure to the military ethos
(traditionally anti-communist in Latin American militaries), or during their
immersion in the Counter-revolutionary mystic of the guerrilla movement.
Our informants internalized the basic themes, values and identity of the
movement. This military ethos that was internalized during this phase
stressed themes of legitimacy, in-group vs out-group, and inevitable victory.
These themes are common in guerrilla war and enable the participants to
arrive at an understanding of the groups need to engage in armed actions.
These beliefs solidify the corporate group identity and heighten political
awareness, and the concomitant motivation associated with these
phenomena. Psychologically it adds a dimension of meaning to what
otherwise can be a Spartan existence. This phase above all fosters a self
identity in the participants, an identity based on their role in the struggle.
Legitimacy themes-democracy and freedom- are stressed to help build a
positive self image, as it implies that the participants are engaged in a historic
and just war to achieve the moral regeneration of the nation through the
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overthrow of the false and illegitimate regime. This ties into the second "in
group out-group" theme, where the battle lines are clearly delineated. When
the enemy has been clearly identified, actions can be taken in a swift and
decisive manner. Inevitable victory themes (God is on our side, freedom
cannot be suppressed ) also increases the participants morale and functions as
a bandwagon effect during recruitment.
The religious beliefs were structured to give intellectually satisfying
answers to any possible outcomes of events. Castro's involvement with
Voodoo gave plausible explanations to the setbacks of the 1960-1965 guerrilla
campaign. The ethos of the Freedom Commandos was augmented by these
beliefs about the Saints sanctioning and aiding the cause. In prison, potential
death from the dynamite explosion was rendered meaningful and articulated
in poems which gave a religious solution to the terror that the dynamite
invoked. This solution served to reduce stress and induce moods of resolve
in the prisoners. Suffering, bayonetings and death all came to be understood
in a systematic way. Communism's defeat at the hands of God and the Saints
was inevitable, and the prisoners based their actions on these beliefs.
In prison the former commandos continued to organize, rejecting the
symbolism of the blue uniforms and clearly distinguishing themselves from
the common criminals. Shouts of "Viva Cristo Rev" publicly announced
their continued ideological position. Bible reading sessions, solidarity in the
face of punishment (the cry of "all or none" during time in El Huicio). the
refusal to betray the memory of fallen comrades, all underline the importance
of religion and primary groups when determining loyalties and conducting
political recruitment.

Hence, we as anthropologists must guard against lapsing into the
narrow view that ideology serves solely as a mask for material self interest,
for it is an erroneous assumption. By honoring the wider view of culture and
belief as a question of meaning and not one of utility, we come closer to
describing that social reality.
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